



HODDER AND STOUGHTON

* N.P.WILLIAMS *

THE GRACE OF GOD

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by

N. P. WILLIAMS, D.D.



HODDER AND STOUGHTON

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INTRODUCTORY

THE theological meaning of the word "grace" is defined by the *New English Dictionary* in the following terms: "The divine influence which operates in men to regenerate and sanctify, to inspire virtuous impulses, and to impart strength to endure trial and resist temptation." From the specifically Christian point of view this is doubtless an admirably exact definition. It could, however, by the simple substitution of "supernatural" or "supernormal" for "divine" be transformed into a definition at least partially expressive of a concept which transcends the bounds of Christianity, and of which the origins run back into the most primitive *strata* of religious feeling that anthropological science can disclose. For—paradoxical though it may seem—the idea of "grace," in the sense of supernatural power, would seem to be older than the idea of God, in the fully developed monotheistic sense. What notion of God may have been possessed by our remote semi-bestial forefathers half a million years ago, we cannot tell: all that we know for certain is that, during the recent and comparatively brief period of our race's life which is illuminated by the steady light of history or the vaguer glow of scientific inference and conjecture, the Hebraic and Christian conception of God appears as the final product of a long and toilsome development, whilst the notion of a mysterious power, which endows its human possessors with daring, skill, cunning, strength, health, happiness and virtue, is found in the earliest stages of pre-animistic religion or of that "magico-religious plasm" which some anthropologists postulate as the common *matrix* both of magic and of

religion. This notion is generally described by a term borrowed from the Melanesians and generalised so as to become a category of universal applicability within the sphere of savage religion, the term *mana*.

The idea of *mana* would seem to represent one of man's earliest essays at a theoretical explanation of the uncanny, the awful, or the "numinous". The imagined force for which it stands is essentially impersonal, and may reside in a stone, an amulet, a tree, a fish, bird, or beast: though human beings, living or dead, and superhuman spirits or dæmons are in a special sense its store-houses. The mysterious power of those men who stand out above their fellows, kings, *meneurs* or mob-leaders, the bravest warriors, the most cunning huntsmen—and of their ghosts after they are dead—is accounted for by the supposition that they are charged with an exceptionally high degree of *mana*: and the same simple hypothesis equally explains the speed of an unusually swift canoe, or the fertility of a fruitful patch of yams. On this aboriginal plane of thought and feeling, religion consists in acquiring *mana* for one's self or in manipulating it for ends subserving the welfare of the community, magic in directing it against one's enemies or in manipulating it for selfish and anti-social ends. For in itself *mana* is neither good nor bad, but merely super-normal and indefinitely potent: it is like an electric current, which if guided into one channel can benefit man by providing him with light and heat, if released into another works nothing but death and destruction.

In the great religions of Eastern Asia, Hinduism and Buddhism, the idea of the Divine, though progressively refined and sublimated, has remained impersonal. But in Judaism and Christianity, the evolution of religion has been consistently in the direction not merely of spiritualising but of personalising it. As the belief in magically potent stocks and stones dies out, as ghosts give place to gods, and gods many to the dawning revelation of the Supreme and Only God, the action of the

Divine upon man tends, or should logically tend, to be conceived as the influence of a Person upon a person, rather than as the impact of a blind force upon a thing. Nor, for orthodox Christians, is this conception inconsistent with the recognition of the supra-personal (though not impersonal) character of Absolute Deity: for the ineffable unoriginate God is believed to reveal Himself to and act upon mankind through those two eternal yet originate modes of His Being which, using human language, we call His Word and His Spirit or Breath, and for which the least inadequate generic name that we can find is that of "Person". But the precise *rationale* of this beneficent action by God upon man, which in technical language we call the bestowal of "grace", is, and has been since the days of St. Augustine, a matter of debate and even of acute controversy. This is due, partly to the fact that the category of "personality" is a relatively late arrival in the field of philosophic speculation, being in fact the creation rather than the presupposition of Christian theology: partly to the inevitable (Kant would say, in the nature of things insuperable) difficulty which the mind encounters in retorting its activity upon itself and endeavouring to make itself the object of its own investigations: partly to the fact that the intellect cannot but mechanise and crystallise its concepts in order to be able to grasp them at all, and by dissecting the living wealth and variety of psychic experience inevitably reduces it to a dead and fossilised congeries of *disiecta membra*: and finally to the innate unwillingness of our imagination to honour the undertakings given to itself by the intellect, which brings it about that whilst in theory we conceive "grace" as a personal influence, in fact we imagine it as a quasi-physical force. Religion, like the individual, is apt to be haunted by unconscious memories of its infancy: the term employed in Catholic Germany to denote miraculous images, *Gnadenbilder*, "grace-pictures", illustrates with peculiar vividness the way in which primitive and savage ideas, such as that of supernatural potency residing in or connected with material

fetish-objects, may even at the present day continue to flourish on the level of popular feeling, as distinct from that of abstract theology.

The problem of the exact nature of grace, difficult enough in itself, has been further complicated by the divergent idiosyncrasies of the thinkers who have dealt with it. To the passionate, mystical, "twice-born" soul, which has known the depths of guilt and the ecstasy of sudden conversion by a power apparently independent of its own volition, the complete dependence of man upon God, and his total inability even to begin of himself to desire the good, are the most self-evident of facts. Such a conviction is naturally reinforced by the theological doctrines of the Fall and of Original Sin, which, as I have endeavoured to show elsewhere, derive their origin and abiding vitality from the same type of religious experience.¹ A theologian of this class cannot but observe that, whilst all may equally inherit a tainted or enfeebled nature, not all are permanently converted: and, assuming man's total and unqualified dependence upon God, it follows that the wicked continue to be wicked because God has not seen fit to grant them the grace of conversion. But, as God foresees all things, He must have known from all eternity upon whom He purposed to bestow grace, and upon whom not: and must, indeed, have fore-ordained the vessels of His mercy to eternal life, whether He be conceived as reprobating, or merely as "passing over", the vessels of wrath, whose end is destruction. Viewed in this light, the phenomenon of conversion tends to generate an iron predestinarianism, in which the moral universe appears as a solid block bound together by a necessity no less inexorable than that which governs the physical world, and efficacious grace becomes an irresistible force directed by illimitable knowledge. Of such "twice-born" thinkers, Augustine is the acknowledged leader and chief.

In sharp contrast with this view of grace as power stands

¹ *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin.*

that which is natural to the calm, robustly ethical common sense of the "once-born" religious thinker. Never having known the torments of unsuccessful struggle with unruly passion or the crisis of sudden emotional sublimation, he tends to minimise or discard any doctrine of a hereditary debility of human nature as a morbid figment, and exalts the self-determining power of free will. To such temperaments the idea of grace as involving a real, even if mysterious and impalpable, pressure upon the springs of our volition, as standing in a genuinely causal relation to the motions of our spirit, seems an almost intolerable outrage upon man's God-given autonomy: they will hardly hesitate to affirm with Julian of Eclanum that by bestowing free will upon His creatures the Creator "emancipated" them from dependence upon Himself. The religious and the moral consciousnesses seem to be here at loggerheads, and it is with the latter that the "once-born" thinker sides. Following out the principle that the influence of God upon man must be conceived as that of a Person on a person, he would—perhaps too anthropomorphically—rule out of the category of possible modes of the Divine action all such as would come under the head of "undue influence" in a testamentary law-suit; and, like Pelagius of old, would confine the meaning of grace to those Divine procedures which may be deemed to appeal to the rational understanding, such as the bestowal of information as to the contents of the moral law through the teaching of prophets and sages, and the provision of object-lessons of virtue in the lives of the saints and most especially of the Christ Himself. If the "twice-born" genius inevitably tends to conceive of grace as power, it is no less true that the "once-born" tends to identify it with intellectual Instruction or Illumination.

The difficulties inherent in each of these conceptions are obvious. The conception of grace as power, with its logically necessary context of an apparently arbitrary predestinarianism seems to dissolve away the moral character of God and sublimates

Him into a non-moral Absolute, to whom, or which, it is useless to cry for mercy or help: of Calvin, the most rigorous thinker of this type, an impartial critic has said: "[He] was as pure, though not as conscientious or consistent, a Pantheist as Spinoza."¹ If, however, grace be rationalized into moral precept and example, and a proud independence be attributed to human free will, in virtue of which man may look God in the face and, in effect, declare, "I have little, or no need of Thy help," then God is so limited that He becomes little more than an Elder Brother, who may claim affectionate respect but not adoration and awe. Moreover, that unique and ineffable relation of the soul to Christ, which is described in the Johannine texts, "I am the Vine, ye are the branches," and "Without Me, ye can do nothing" is flatly denied, and the heart thereby cut out of vital Christianity. Nor are all difficulties necessarily avoided by that view of the interplay of Divine grace and human will which, borrowing an expressive term from the controversies of the Reformation period, we may denote as Synergism—the view, namely, that whilst God truly acts upon the human will to incline it towards goodness, such action is not so overwhelming that it cannot be resisted, and that man, even though fallen, still retains liberty to co-operate or not to co-operate with the assistance so vouchsafed to him. This, indeed, is the working faith of all who intelligently value the Sacraments. For there is evidently no physical, and would seem *prima facie* to be no metaphysical, compulsion to receive the Sacraments: which are placed within our reach, to use or not to use as we will: which, according to the most spiritual doctrine of their efficacy, demand voluntary effort on the part of the recipient to appropriate and assimilate the gift which they convey: and which, on an ultra-logical predestinarian theory, would be otiose irrelevances, a fifth wheel to the coach of God's selective purpose. Yet the problems raised by the conception of grace as power are not solved by the expedient of diminishing the amount of

¹ A. M. Fairbairn, *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*.

power involved. And the association of grace with the employment of material means, water, oil, bread and wine, has exposed it to the reproach of being merely an infantile regression to savage modes of feeling, a mere revival of that primitive conception of "good *mana*" inherent in sacred objects, which, as we have seen, represents what according to anthropology is the earliest notion of supernatural energy formed by man.

The question of the nature of grace thus inevitably raises the profounder questions of the nature of God, and of His relation to the universe and to man: and a complete answer to it would necessarily appear as a part of, or chapter in, a complete metaphysical theology, which would exhibit the whole hierarchy of created existences, in all its levels and gradations, as utterly dependent on yet unambiguously distinct from the uncreated Divine Essence, and would reconcile in one self-evident and satisfying harmony the secular antinomies of the Absolute and the relative, Eternity and the Time-process, Divine foreknowledge and human free will. Such an answer, even if it be possible at all to our present faculties, can clearly not be attempted here. Yet the term "grace", if the Christian religion is true at all, stands for a reality, apprehended by immediate intuition: and it ought to be possible to gather, from what the saints—especially those saints who have been gifted with the faculty of analysing and recording their experiences—have felt, at least a description of it sufficient to enable us to make real to ourselves the language of Christian devotion and liturgy with regard to the subject. The intellectual constructions, or theories of grace, which successive schools of divines have invented may have been seamed with faults and inconsistencies of various kinds: but each embodies some aspect of the truth, and springs from the impact of some vital element on a devout and sensitive soul. The method of this essay, therefore, will be not scholastic but historical: we shall briefly trace the development of the conception of grace within the sphere of Christian theology, in the hope that such a review will enable us to state,

in a manner sufficient for practical purposes, what grace actually is, and to formulate a description of its operations which, so far as may be, shall do justice to all sides of our experience, intellectual, moral and religious alike. For reasons of space, as well as of clearness, the scope of our inquiry must be strictly limited to the questions of the *nature* and *working* of grace, and we must therefore treat this subject in rigorous isolation from the closely related questions of the *grounds* upon which God may be deemed to bestow grace, and of the *channels* through which it is believed to be normally imparted: in other words, our method will necessarily debar us from treating, except incidentally, of the great mystery of the Atonement, nor shall we be able, except in the same incidental manner, to discuss the *modus operandi* of the Sacraments.

"GRACE" IN CHRISTIAN THOUGHT BEFORE ST. AUGUSTINE

THE natural starting-point of a history of the theological concept of "grace" is an examination of the meaning of the word *χάρις*, as used by St. Paul, the first and greatest of Christian theologians.

The primary significance of this word is "beauty", "charm", "attraction"; in this sense Homer employs the term to denote the unearthly beauty shed by the gods upon their favourites, as when Athene poured supernatural "grace" upon Telemachus entering the assembly of Ithacan nobles:

θεομετρίῳ δ' ἄρα τῷ γε χάριν κατέχευεν Ἀθήνη¹

or upon Odysseus after his meeting with Nausicaa:

*ὅς δ' ὅτε τὸν χρυσὸν περιχέεται ἀργύρῳ ἄνθρωπος,
ὅν Ἥφαιστος δέδωκεν καὶ Πάλλας Ἀθήνη
τέχνην παντὶ ἄνθρωπῳ, χαρίεντα δὲ ἔργα τέλει,
ὅς ἄρα τῷ κατέχευε χάριν κεφαλῇ τε καὶ ὤμῳ·
ἔπειτ' ἔπειτ' ἀπόκρυβε κύνῃ ἐπὶ θύρῃ θαλάσσης
κάλλει καὶ χάρισι στήθεσιν²*

"as when a cunning artificer, taught by Hephaestus and Pallas Athene in every manner of art, pours gold around silver and fashions graceful works, so did the goddess pour grace upon him, on head and shoulders; then going apart he sat down upon the shore of the sea, glowing with beauty and graces." From this significance of "beauty" is derived the secondary sense of "kindness", "goodwill" or "graciousness", that is, of the

¹ *Od.*, ii, 12.

² *Ibid.*, vi, 232-7.

mental or emotional quality lying behind an attractive physical appearance. So Sophocles makes Tecmessa say:

ἔγνωκα γὰρ δὴ φωτὸς ἡπατημένη
καὶ τῆς παλαιᾶς χάριτος ἐκβεβλημένη¹

“I see now that I have been deceived by my lord and cast forth from his former grace.” The most common meaning borne by the word in classical Greek is “thanks” or “gratitude”: but this has no bearing on its theological use. In the Septuagint, *χάρις* is the standing equivalent² of the Hebrew *חֵן*, which carries the same double significance, *viz.* (1) “grace” in the sense of beauty either of body or mind, and (2) “graciousness” or kindness of disposition. “Grace” in the Old Testament occurs very frequently as part of the idiom “to find grace,” or “favour” (*יָחַן חֵן* *εὐρεῖν χάριν*), in the eyes of God³ or of a superior. In the LXX of one passage (Zech. xii. 10) it seems to be used absolutely, to denote God’s kindness towards men: “I will pour out upon the house of David and upon the inhabitants of Jerusalem *a spirit of grace and of pity*” (*πνεῦμα χάριτος καὶ σὺκτιρμού.*) This absolute and quasi-technical use of the term appears in the writing of Philo, who affirms the necessity of “divine grace” as a condition of the development of true virtue, with an almost Augustinian stringency.⁴ The idea was thus already rough-hewn for its future position as the foundation stone of the Christian “doctrine of grace”, before the Apostle of the Gentiles began the work of chiselling it into exact lines and contours.

The basic meaning, therefore, of the term “grace” which St. Paul found in existence is that of God’s favour or kindness towards man, or certain men. But this “favour” is not con-

¹ *Ajax*, 808–9.

² See Hatch and Redpath, *Concordance to the LXX*, s.v. (ii, p. 1455, iii, p. 195).

³ Cf. St. Luke i, 30: *εὔρες γὰρ χάριν παρὰ τῷ θεῷ.*

⁴ *De ebriet* (Mangey, i. p. 379): *ἀνευ γὰρ θείας χάριτος ἀμήχανον ἵστακτῆσαι τὰ θνητὰ ἢ τοῖς ἀεὶ παραμεῖναι.*

ceived merely as an abstract quality or state of His Being: it is a quality manifested in operation, of a twofold kind: there is, first, the pre-mundane act whereby He foreknows certain individuals and fore-ordains them to membership of the Church, so that the small body of Christian Jews can be described as a *λεῖμμα κατ' ἐκλογὴν χάριτος*¹ a "remnant constituted by an act of selection based upon 'grace'": and there is, secondly, the temporal act of "calling" and "justifying" (or pardoning) the individual so foreknown, which, though *ex parte hominis* to be considered as contingent upon the individual's "faith", *ex parte Dei* is so spontaneous an ebullition of omnipotent and sovereign power that all Christians must think of themselves as *δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι*,² "acquitted freely, undeservedly, [solely] by an exercise of His royal grace". "Grace", in Pauline thought, is thus primarily the grace of election and justification, rather than of sanctification. It has to do with the beginnings of the Christian life, its ideal beginning in God's pre-mundane counsels and its concrete beginning in time, rather than with its continuance and progress. The concept which the word connotes is regal, governmental, and judicial in character: it presupposes a way of thinking about God which regards Him as acting upon men and shaping their destinies from without, as a king might in a moment of benevolence ennoble a subject who had been fortunate enough to attract his favourable attention, or pardon a criminal on the occasion of his coronation.³ The "twice-born" element in St. Paul's temperament, which made his own instantaneous conversion appear to him simply as a catastrophic

¹ Rom. xi, 5.

² Ibid., iii, 24.

³ The same idea, of the Creator's (apparently) arbitrary and unmotivated attitude of benevolence towards certain chosen individuals appears in the word *εὐδοκία*, "good pleasure", and its cognates, as applied to God: cf. 1 Cor. i, 21; Gal. i, 15; Eph. i, 5, 9; Phil. ii, 13 (quoted below). In Luke ii, 14 all men as such appear to be the objects of the Divine *εὐδοκία*.

irruption of the Divine Will into his life, neither caused nor even prepared for by his pre-conversion training or experiences,¹ leads him to insist again and again upon the completely unmerited and gratuitous character of the Divine favour, and to inveigh against the idea that it can be earned by “works”, or human effort of any kind.² And what is true of the “grace” which makes men members of the redeemed community is true equally of the narrower or more specialized “grace” which appoints individuals to particular functions in the community—a apostleship, or the office of prophet or teacher—or assigns specific *χαρίσματα* to them:³ all “grace”, whether general or particular in its bearing, represents the spontaneous self-caused kindness of God towards His chosen, a kindness which no efforts of theirs could have evoked if He had not willed to feel it. The tendency of this line of thought is to exhibit the idea of the grace of election and justification as set in a context of adamantine predestinarianism. The more absolute the King who gives or withholds His favour, the more overwhelming and ineluctable His dominion over the whole realm of being, so much the more impossible does it become to discover in the universality of His causation any interstices in which human freedom may find a hiding-place: and the idea of “grace” inevitably generates the correlative idea of reprobation, the “vessels of mercy” standing out in clear distinction from the “vessels of wrath”, but both alike being moulded by the Almighty Potter out of the same common clay of human kind.[

This conception of the grace of election and justification, which tends to represent God as moving His human creatures from without, like pawns on a chess-board, stands quite apart from the thought of God’s subtle operations within the soul,

¹ Gal. i, 14.

² Cf. Rom. iii, 24, *δικαίμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι* : iv. 4, *τῷ δὲ ἐργαζομένῳ ὁ μισθὸς σὺ λοίζεται κατὰ χάριν* : iv, 16, *διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ πλεονέκειας, ἵνα κατὰ χάριν* : ix, 16, *ἄρα οὖν οὐ τοῦ θέλοντος, οὐδὲ τοῦ τρέχοντος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐλεοῦντος, θεοῦ* : xi, 6, *εἰ δὲ χάριτι, οὐκέτι ἐξ ἔργων ἐπεὶ ἡ χάρις οὐκέτι γίνεται χάρις*.

³ Cf. Rom. xii, 6, *ἔχοντες χαρίσματα κατὰ τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσαν ἡμῖν διάφορα* : I Cor. xv, 10, *χάριτι δὲ θεοῦ εἰμὶ ὃ εἰμι*

⁴ Cf. Rom. ix, 19-24.

penetrating, healing and building up, to which the name of "sanctifying grace" has been given by later theology.¹ It must not, however, be supposed that St. Paul did not possess the idea of a healing power going forth from God: on the contrary, he affirms emphatically that the essence of the Gospel is Divine power, sweeping on to the goal of salvation everyone that believeth, the Jew first and also the Greek.² But the Pauline name for this supernatural energy or power is *πνεῦμα*, "Spirit", and not "grace".³ It might seem as though an omnipotent influence which penetrates the citadel of the soul to its most secret recesses and gradually transforms it from within was as little to be reconciled with human freedom as a sovereign Divine will compelling from without. Whether this be so in logic or not, the Apostle refuses to admit it. In his thought, the viewless tides of "Spirit", or of "the Spirit", insensibly flood the springs of human volition in such a way that the Spirit-possessed individual does what is right because he spontaneously desires to do what is right, not because of any external sanction or coercion; the virtues which are the "fruit of the Spirit" are also the products of his own self-determining effort. Hence the state of adoption, or sonship, enjoyed by the baptized Christian, is from one point of view described as being "not under Law but under 'grace'";⁴ from another, as serving God "in newness of spirit, not in oldness of letter".⁵ The antitheses between "Law" and "grace", on the one hand, and between "letter" and "Spirit", on the other, are but different ways of exhibiting the contrast between the Old Dispensation and the

¹ See below, p. 105.

² Rom. i, 16.

³ The nearest approximations in the Pauline *corpus* to a quasi-hypostatisation of *χάρις* as = "power" appear to be 1 Cor. xv, 10, οὐκ ἐγὼ δὲ ἀλλ' ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ σὺν ἐμοὶ (sc. ἐκσπίασε): and 2 Cor. xii, 9, ἀρκεῖ σοι ἡ χάρις μου.

⁴ Rom. vi, 15.

⁵ Rom. vii, 6. Note that in Gal. v, 18, the contrast is between "Law" and "spirit".

New, and, taken together, contain the potentiality of a unification of the ideas of "grace" and "Spirit": for the possession of "Spirit" is the corollary and the sure proof of the enjoyment of "grace". Nevertheless, it is possible to "grieve" the Spirit,¹ and to "fall from" God's "grace", or favour.² The ideas of human freedom and of Divine grace, issuing in sanctifying power, are thus set side by side with no attempt at harmonization: and the Apostle is content to rest in the unsolved paradox, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who worketh in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure."³

For the elucidation of the Apostle's unsystematised thoughts regarding "grace", "Spirit", and human free will, it is natural to look in the first instance to the great primitive teachers of Greek-speaking Christendom. But the early Greek Fathers, though nearest of all Christian thinkers to St. Paul in time and place and language, were far removed from him in temperament. The Hellenic spirit of balance, proportion, sanity and healthy-mindedness, which on the whole, and abstracting from certain expressions of an exaggerated asceticism, may be said to pervade their works, stamps these writers as typically "once-born" religious thinkers, for whom the one fixed point from which all discussion of God's relations with the soul necessarily starts is the assumption of man's unqualified freedom of choice. Hence, little of immediate interest for our present inquiry is to be gathered from them. The word *χάρις* is not infrequently met with, as denoting God's "kindliness" or "favour": but, in the Greek Fathers' exposition of the outcome of God's "grace", it is moral and intellectual illumination rather than election or justification which occupies the foreground, so far as the individual is concerned: and the primary object of *χάρις* is perhaps rather the human race as a whole, for

¹ Eph. iv, 30.

² Gal. v, 4.

³ Phil. ii, 12, 13.

which the Divine kindliness manifests itself most conspicuously in the great massive facts of Revelation, the Incarnation, Christ's triumph over Satan and the demons.¹

If we inquire how the doctors of Hellenic Christendom expounded the ideas of sanctification, of the Divine penetration and transformation of the soul, of energy as flowing forth from God to heal the wounds and build up the tissues of human personality, we shall find that the beginnings of sanctification are universally attributed to the gift of the Holy Spirit received in baptism, a rite of which what we now know as "Confirmation" then formed an integral part. In the continuation of the process the part played by the Holy Spirit is also given full recognition: progress in holiness is regularly ascribed to the effects of His powerful and beneficent operation. We find the term "grace" specifically linked with His name as early as the first Christian century:² and from that time onward mention is made of "the grace of the Holy Spirit", until in the fourth century it becomes a common conception among writers of very different schools of thought.³ But the Greek Fathers do not seem to have laid stress upon any very precise conception of the Spirit's action. We find, indeed, a frequent use of the word χάρις in the *Homilies* of St. Macarius the Egyptian, which displays a surprising approximation to the later Western use of the term *gratia*, in that it appears to denote not merely a subjective state of God's being, but an objective and, so to speak, externalised power flowing forth from Him:⁴ a power which in several places

¹ Cf. O. Kirn, art. "Gnade", in Herzog-Hauck, *Real-Encycl.*, vi, p. 719 (1899).

² Clem. Rom. *ad Cor.* xlv, 6, cf. Hebr. x, 29.

³ e.g. Irenaeus *adv. haer.* 5, 8, 1: Hippol. *c. Noet.* 14: creed of Antioch of 344 (Arian) *ad fin.*, ap. Athan. *de synod.* 26 (741D): Athan. *or. c. Ar.* 3, 24 (574A), *ad. Serap.* 1, 4 (651B): Epiphan. *ancor.* 69, 1: Bas. *de Spir. sanct.* 26 (63): Greg. Nyss. *quod non tres dii* (PG XLV 129B): Theod. Mops. *in Aggaeum* ii, 5 (PG LXVI/485A): Chrys. *in Ioann. hom.* 14. 2 (Ben. 8, 81A).

⁴ Note especially *Hom.* (PG XXXIV) vi, 2; vii, 4; viii, 2-5; xii, 3, 4, xvii, 5-8; xxiv. 5 *ad fin.*, 6; xxvi, 6; xxvii, 11.

is connected, or even identified, by Macarius with the Holy Spirit.¹ But broadly speaking, the Eastern theology of "grace" was as fluid and undefined as the Eastern doctrine of man and of sin. Neither the subjective idea of God's "favour" or "kindliness" nor the objective notion of His sanctifying power received any elaborate or technical explication from Hellenic thinkers. It is in the essentially practical thought of the West, with its illustrious line of "twice-born" thinkers, that the most imposing and most systematic development of the idea of "grace" is to be sought.

As in the case of the companion doctrine of Original Sin, it is Tertullian who is the first to strike out the dominant lines of a new development. It does not seem over-fanciful to distinguish three senses in which he uses the word *gratia* (originally the exact equivalent in meaning of χάρις, and its normal representative in the Old Latin versions of the New Testament) namely (1) God's kindness as shown in His pardon of sins (i.e. the "grace of justification") a genuinely Pauline signification; (2) the total spiritual effect of baptism, including both pardon for past sins and the gift of the Holy Spirit—here we notice a tendency to confuse, or at least conflate, χάρις and πνεῦμα; and (3) the transforming Divine energy which works in the individual Christian, and may even override his free will. A typical instance of the last-mentioned use of the term is to be found in the following *dictum*: "Even stones will become children of Abraham, if they are shaped into conformity with Abraham's faith; and even the offspring of vipers will bring forth fruits of repentance, if they first spew forth the venom of wickedness. Such will be the power of divine grace, which is assuredly mightier than nature, having in subjection to itself

¹ *Hom.* iv, 6; ix, 7; x, 2; xv, 4; xviii, 1, 11; xix, 7. χάρις is expressly identified with the Holy Spirit also by two other Egyptian Fathers, Didymus (*de Trin.* ii, 1; PG XXXIX. 452C) and St. Cyril (*Thesaur.* 34, 352D); and by the earlier Cappadocian Father St. Basil (*ep.* 105); and cf. Orig. in *Ioann. hom.* 2-10, 77 (G.C.S. 65, 27 ff.)

within us the faculty of free will.”¹ Here it would seem that the idea of sanctifying power has been, at least partially, detached from the idea of the personal Spirit of God, and hypostatised into an *impersonal* force, which is labelled “grace”—a complete departure from Pauline usage and from the natural meaning both of *χάρις* and of *gratia*. It is to be noticed that this latter conception gives rise to the antithesis between “nature” (that is, fallen human nature) and “grace” as a Divine force impinging upon it from without; we may add, that the silent yet far-reaching change which the meaning of the word “grace” had begun to undergo is expressed in the fact that from now onwards the patristic opposition between “nature” and “grace” tends to push the Pauline opposition between “works” and “grace” more and more into the background of Christian thought.

It is probable that Tertullian’s notion of “grace” as supernatural power, in so far as it was abstracted from the Person of the Holy Spirit, was conceived in a thoroughly materialistic fashion. Certainly the essence of the Spirit, like that of the human soul, is regarded by him as a highly rarefied and tenuous fluid: for he tells us that the element of water was sanctified for its future baptismal use by the brooding of the Spirit upon it at the Creation, the subtler and more ethereal Divine substance thus sinking into and mingling with the grosser.² The demonic influences which are opposed to the Spirit are in the same way thought of as a physical miasma or contagion, which is able to attack both the body and soul of man in virtue of the “wondrous subtlety and tenuity” of the demons’ substance.³ We notice here the first conspicuous appearance within Christian

¹ *De an.* 21: “et lapides filii Abrahæ fient, si in fidem Abrahæ formentur. Et genimina uiperarum fructum pænitiæ facient, si uenena malignitatis expuerint. Hæc erit uis diuinæ gratiæ, potentior utique, natura, habens in nobis subiacentem sibi liberam arbitrii potestatem, quod αὐτεξούσιον dicitur.”

² *De bapt.* 4.

³ *Apol.* 22.

thought of that characteristic *παρέκβασις* or perversion into which the idea of spiritual power is always liable to relapse, the savage conception of a quasi-physical fluid or *mana* which is locally resident in material things. A convinced adherent of the Stoic metaphysic, an admirer of *Seneca sæpe noster*,¹ such as was Tertullian, is not likely to have envisaged the idea of an impersonal sanctifying force in terms of a higher refinement or immateriality than those in which he conceived the Spirit of God, the soul of man, and the demons. It is therefore not unfair to assign to the Father of Latin theology the initial responsibility both for the confusion between Divine favour and Divine power, which, as we shall see, inevitably worked itself out into the Augustinian and Calvinistic systems of predestinarianism, and also for a certain coarsening of the idea of Divine power, which has laid the Western Catholic conception of grace open to the reproach of being "sub-personal", "unethical" and "mechanical".

¹ *De an.* 20.

GRACE IN ST. AUGUSTINE

THE years that intervened between the careers of Tertullian and of St. Augustine must be passed over, as barren of any developments in the conception of "grace" worthy of special note: though we may observe that Victorinus still employs the term in its accurate and Pauline sense of God's favour, manifested in His pardon of sin,¹ and, on the other hand, that St. Ambrose occasionally alludes to the contrast between "nature" and "grace",² which, it would seem, had already become, under the influence of Tertullian, a conventional category of Western soteriological thought. It is Augustine who must be reckoned as the real artificer of the ecclesiastical concept of "grace" in the sense of Divine power, as of the companion concept of "original sin". Until he bent his energies to the task of scientifically diagnosing the hereditary wound of the human soul and of thinking out the nature of the remedy, the two ideas had developed independently, in so far as they had developed at all: Augustine, in the light of his own cataclysmic experience of instantaneous conversion from sin to God, elaborated them in intimate logical connection, as correlative members of a vast intellectual scheme which we now know as the "doctrine of grace", thereby adding a whole new area to the domain of systematic theology. To gain an accurate understanding of Augustine's notion of "grace" it will be necessary briefly to survey the whole soteriological system of which it forms a part. Of the opposing system of Pelagianism, in death-grapple with

¹ In Eph. i, 7.

² Cf. *de myst.* ix, 52: *expos. in ev. sec. Luc.* viii, 32: *de Ios. patriarch.* xi, 63.

which the Augustinian doctrine attained to its own complete articulation and definition, no more need be said than that it (a) denied the whole idea of a "Fall" or primitive moral catastrophe infecting all succeeding generations of mankind with a hereditary moral weakness; (b) affirmed the present integrity of human nature and the unlimited freedom of the human will, a freedom so complete that man may in virtue of its possession be described as "emancipated" from God's control; (c) as the logical consequence of the two foregoing positions, confined the meaning of "grace" (in the sense of saving power) to the exterior influences exercised upon man's reason and will by the existence of a moral law, by moral instruction in general, and by the human example of Christ.

The initial premise of Augustine's system consists in the doctrine of the Fall, as worked out by the Doctor of Hippo on the basis of the somewhat vague conceptions inherited by St. Paul from the Jewish apocalyptists and in the light of his own specifically "twice-born" religious experience.¹ Adam, created in a state of original perfection and righteousness, forfeited these endowments, corrupted his own nature, and incurred an infinite guilt which merited eternal damnation, by eating the forbidden fruit. But, inasmuch as at the moment of his sin Adam included, or rather was, the human race (the whole of his subsequent posterity existing seminally in his loins), it follows, according to Augustine, that all men "sinned in" him, and so justly shared in the consequences of his sin. Mankind, accordingly, in virtue of its "seminal identity" with the primordial sinner, constitutes in the sight of God a "mass of sin" or "of perdition" (*massa peccati, damnationis, damnata*, etc.), every member of which is in the order of nature a "child of wrath" and doomed to everlasting death. So stringently literal, in Augustine's opinion, is the identity between Adam and his

¹ For a more detailed description of the Augustinian Fall-doctrine, with references, see the author's Bampton Lectures, *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin* (1927), pp. 327-9, 360-74.

posterity that even personally innocent babes are said to *deserve* eternal flames because of their supposed pre-natal participation in their ancestor's sinful act; and no one would have had any right to complain or to impugn God's justice if the dread sentence had been carried out in full, and the whole of humanity consigned to damnation for evermore. The Doctor of Hippo insists again and again that God was under no sort of obligation to redeem anyone at all. However, the Almighty's kindness (*gratia*) impels Him to elect in eternity, and to call in time, certain favoured individuals out of the "damned mass" as vessels of His mercy, whom He purposes, in due season, to bring to faith in Christ and to the saving waters of baptism. The number of these elect is unknown to us, but they are a comparatively small minority of mankind.¹ The vessels of wrath, who are the unfavoured majority, remain subject to a decree not so much of reprobation as of *preterition* or "passing over": that is, they are simply left in the "mass of perdition", which, as I have said elsewhere, "steadily gravitates, under the inexorable pressure of the divine justice, towards the bottomless pit".² On the principles mentioned above, however, those who are so "passed over" have no right to complain, for they merely receive what they have *ex hypothesi* deserved (by "original sin"): whilst the elect have, naturally, every reason to glorify God for His mercy. The divine mercy and the divine justice are thus, according to Augustine, triumphantly reconciled.

Though this whole scheme of ideas may appear to the modern student as a hardened and exaggerated representation of St. Paul's predestinarianism, taking much *au pied de la lettre* that in the Apostle was tentative or merely rhetorical, it is fair to observe that the Augustinian use of the term "grace" does not,

¹ The number of the saved is large in itself ("a multitude which no man can number"), but small relatively to that of the lost (*op. imperf. c. Iul. ii*, 142, 205, 208, 209). The list of the elect is in any case absolutely fixed, and cannot be varied ("ita certus est numerus ut nec addatur eis quisquam nec minuatur ex eis", *de corr. et. grat.* 39).

² The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin (1927), p. 376.

so far, depart from its primary Pauline sense, that of the "grace of election": and, in the true Pauline manner, the unmerited character of this grace is repeatedly emphasized—*gratia nisi gratis est gratia non est*,¹ a phrase doubtless suggested by St. Paul's εἰ δὲ χάριτι, οὐκ ἐτι ἐξ ἔργων. ἐπεὶ ἡ χάρις οὐκ ἐτι γίνεται χάρις.² What appears to us to be the arbitrariness of this grace is empirically established by the fact that some children of Christian parents actually do die, through various accidental causes, before being rescued from the *massa peccati* by baptism, and consequently (in accordance with the principles stated above) are damned, though their congenital demerits are *ex hypothesi* not greater than those of their more fortunate fellows (sometimes the offspring of non-Christian parents) who are brought by divine providence to the laver of regeneration:³ and it is excused by the well-known device of postulating an "occult justice" in God, which is of such a transcendent and incomprehensible order that in the eyes of mere men it may well bear a remarkable resemblance to injustice. "How unsearchable are His judgements, and His ways past finding out!"

Through baptism, the recipients of the grace of election receive the remission of sins and the grace of justification: but though the terminology is still Pauline, its sense is no longer exactly that which it bears in St. Paul's writings: for Augustine, misled by the factitive significance of the Latin words *iustificare*, *iustificatio*, uses "justification" in the sense of *making*, not merely of *accounting*, righteous—that is, in the sense of progressive sanctification, not merely of preliminary absolution:⁴

¹ *Enchirid.* cvii: cf. *ep.* ccxvii (*ad Vital.*) 6, 18, "gratia, ut uera sit gratia, non secundum merita nostra datur."

² *Rom.* xi, 6.

³ *C. ii epp. Pelag.* ii, 11: *c. Iulian. Pel.* vi, 6: *op. imperf.* vi, 12.

⁴ *De spir. et lit.* 45, "quid est enim iustificati quam iusti facti, ab illo scilicet qui iustificat impium, ut ex impio fiat iustus?" *De grat. et lib. arbitr.* 13, "ideo necessarium est homini, ut gratia Dei non solum iustificetur, id est, ex impio fiat iustus . . ."

and the connotation of the term *gratia* becomes correspondingly enlarged so as to include not merely the favour which God feels towards His elect, but the *power, gift or help* which He infuses into their souls to develop their moral and spiritual perfection. This development of the meaning of "grace" was stereotyped for Western theology by the Council held at Carthage in A.D. 418—"quicumque dixerit, gratiam Dei qua iustificatur homo per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum *ad solam remissionem peccatorum* ualere quae iam commissa sunt, non etiam *ad adiutorium* ut non committantur, A.S."¹ And the conception of grace as power received in the second treatise *ad Simplicianum* a name which was destined to become technical in Latin theology, though unknown to St. Paul, that of "sanctifying grace" (*gratia sanctificans*).²

Such "grace" is absolutely necessary for all Christians in order for them to perform any good work whatsoever. The Augustinian position on this point is well summed up in the fifth canon of the Council of Carthage referred to above: "Whosoever shall say that the grace of justification is given to us, in order that we may be able through grace *more easily* to fulfil that which we are commanded to perform by free will—as though we had the power of fulfilling the divine commandments, even if grace were not given to us, not indeed of fulfilling them easily, but still of fulfilling them without grace—let him be anathema."³ This affirmation is reinforced by the saying of the Lord, as reported by St. John, which became the proof-text for the necessity of grace—"Without me ye can do *nothing*."⁴ Indeed the good works of Jews, heretics and schismatics are due solely to a depotentiated form of the same grace:

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, *Enchiridion Symb. et Def.*, 1913, § 103. Cf. the definition, or description, of grace in *de grat. Christi*, XXXV—"aliquod adiutorium bene agendi adiunctum naturæ atque doctrinæ per inspirationem flagrantissimæ et luminosissimæ caritatis": and *de corr. et grat.*, 3 (grace is an "inspiratio bonæ uoluntatis atque operis").

² *Ad Simpl.* ii, quæst. i, 5.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, § 105.

⁴ St. John xv, 5.

a form which, however, is distinguished from the full measure of grace which is bestowed upon the elect as being "the gift which is given to the sons of the concubines", in contrast with "the gift which is given to the sons of that Jerusalem which is above, free, our mother".¹ Pagans, on the other hand, being incapable of receiving grace, cannot perform any really good or meritorious work at all: their apparent virtues are merely "splendid vices" (to use a phrase which, though not Augustine's, adequately summarises his thought on this point), and all the morality of a Socrates or a Cato is merely a hollow show.

Before passing to the task of determining what precisely, in Augustine's view, is the nature of God's sanctifying grace or gift, we must, in order to have before us a complete conspectus of his conceptions, observe that according to his fully developed teaching the grace of "justification" is not by itself sufficient to bestow eternal life: for this, it needs to be crowned by a further and special grace, that of "final perseverance" (*donum perseverantiae usque in finem*),² which is not by any means bestowed upon all the baptized—for baptized persons may and do backslide, thus relapsing into the *massa peccati* and being carried with it into perdition. It follows from this position that there are two kinds of predestination, namely, (1) predestination to faith, baptism and membership of the Church in this life; (2) predestination to salvation in the life to come, sealed by the bestowal of the grace of final perseverance. If it is permissible, for the sake of clearness, to summarise the gist of Augustine's thought rather more crisply and concisely than is actually done in any passage of his extant writings, the totality of mankind may on this hypothesis be viewed under the figure of three concentric circles: the outermost, and by far the broadest, circular band being filled by the "vessels of wrath", for whom nothing is done, and who are simply left in the "mass of damnation", subject through original sin to God's avenging

¹ *De patient.*, xxvii, 28.

² For this, see the whole treatise *de dono perseverantiae*.

justice: the next innermost containing those who are temporarily picked out of the *massa damnata* by the grace of justification, but who are not granted the grace of final perseverance, with the result that sooner or later they slip back through actual sin into their former lost condition: and the central nucleus embodying the "vessels of mercy", the Divine favourites who are permanently elected out of the sinful mass, brought to faith and baptism, justified and endowed with the gift of final perseverance, and predestined to glory. It is these latter alone, it would seem, who can be described as "predestined" in an absolute sense: they are the "few chosen" of Matthew xxii, 14, standing in sharp contrast with the "many" (represented in our figure by the intermediate ring) who are indeed "called", but are not predestined to obey the call.

What, then, is this Divine energy or force which is to our eyes so arbitrary in its incidence, but so immeasurably potent in its effects upon those whom it touches? If Augustine had frankly equated "sanctifying grace" with the Holy Spirit, his thought would have been at least continuous with that of St. Paul: and, as terminology is merely a matter of convenience, the slight perversion of the Pauline term "kindness" to denote God's kind and healing Power which is the Third Person in His Triune Being would have been pardonable and indeed useful, if care had been taken to guard against the tendency to hypostatise "grace" as an entity other than the Spirit. Once, indeed, he makes this equation in express terms—"gratia quippe Dei donum Dei est: donum autem maximum ipse Spiritus sanctus est, *et ideo gratia dicitur*"¹ and at other times he seems to imply it, as in the following passage—"We, however, maintain that man is in this way divinely aided towards the accomplishment of righteousness, that—over and above the free will with which he was created and the instruction whereby he is taught how he ought to live—he receives the Holy Ghost, by whom there is born in his mind a delight in and a love of that Supreme

¹ *Serm. cxliv, 1.*

and Incommunicable Good, which is God, even now whilst we still walk by faith and not yet by sight . . . But in order that [that which is right] may be loved, the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts, not by free will which arises out of us, but by the Holy Ghost which was given unto us.”¹ Such an identification is further suggested by the application to the Holy Spirit of the title “the finger of God”,² a title which has been made familiar to millions of Christians by its subsequent embodiment in the hymn *Veni Creator*. Yet “grace” is also said to be the gift of, that is given by, the Holy Spirit,³ or the gift of God through the Holy Spirit;⁴ and this *modus loquendi*, whilst naturally suggested by the doctrine of the full Personality of the Paraclete, must have indirectly promoted the tendency to differentiate between Him and “grace”, and to think of the latter as an impersonal force emitted by, but distinguishable from, the essence of Deity.

It would, however, be unfair to accuse St. Augustine himself of having thought in this way. For him “grace” is always the grace of God or of Christ; it is always exhibited by him as an organic self-expression of the life of God, though not decisively brought into logical relation with Trinitarian doctrine. The truest account of the matter seems to be that “grace” in Augustinian terminology means primarily the salvific Will of God, operating partly by way of the providential arrangement of exterior circumstances, partly by the secret inspiration of good thoughts and the communication of interior spiritual vitality: by a natural metonymy, it comes to mean the good thoughts and the spiritual vitality so imparted. This definition sufficiently explains the apparent arbitrariness of “grace”, its medicinal effect, and its irresistible character.

It is true that the actual word *irresistible* does not, according

¹ *De spir, et lit.* 5.

² *Ibid.*, 28.

³ *Ibid.*, 10, 15, 28.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 51 (“*inspirata gratiæ suauitate per Spiritum sanctum*”).

to Loofs, occur in St. Augustine: but the idea seems to be unmistakably expressed by such a phrase as this—"subuentum est igitur infirmitati uoluntatis humane, ut divina gratia *indeclinabiliter et insuperabiliter* ageretur".¹ Many passages might be quoted to illustrate the Augustinian belief in the absolute dominion of God over and in the wills of those whom He chooses to elect, whether to faith only or to faith, final perseverance and glory: but the following will, perhaps, suffice to indicate the character of his thought. "We must not doubt that human wills are incapable of withstanding the Will of God in such a way as to prevent Him from doing what He wishes to do":² "God, however, brought this to pass" (the election of Saul to be king by the Israelites) "solely through the wills of men themselves, inasmuch as He assuredly possesses a most almighty power of inclining human hearts whithersoever it may please Him":³ "to will or not to will is in the power of the man who wills or wills not, only in such a way that it does not impede God's Will or vanquish His power":⁴ "God has men's wills more in His power than they themselves have their wills in their own power"⁵ "Who will be guilty of such impious folly as to assert that God cannot convert to the good such evil wills of men as He wishes, when He wishes, and where He wishes?"⁶ These *dicta* have reference to God's control of human wills as exerted interiorly: the operations of "grace" as providentially arranging the exterior circumstances which contribute to the shaping of our actions is proclaimed in the following: "O Pharisee, thou lovest little, because thou thinkest that little has been forgiven thee . . . 'What then,' quoth he, 'I who have never committed murder, am I to be deemed a murderer? I

¹ *De corr. et grat.* xii, 38.

² *Ibid.*, xiv, 45.

³ *Ibid.*, xiv, 45.

⁴ *Ibid.*, xiv, 43.

⁵ *Ibid.*, xiv, 45.

⁶ *Enchirid.* xcvi.

who have never committed adultery, am I to be punished for adultery?’ . . . But this saith unto thee thy God ‘I was guiding thee for Myself, I was keeping thee for Myself. That thou shouldest not commit adultery, a tempter was absent: that a tempter should be absent, *I* brought it about. Place and time were lacking: and that these should be lacking, *I* brought it about. Suppose, on the contrary, that the tempter was there, and place and time were not wanting: that thou shouldest not consent, *I* terrified thee. Acknowledge therefore the *grace* of Him to whom thou owest that thou didst not commit this crime.’”¹

The meaning of these and other similar passages can hardly be misconstrued: and it is not surprising that the Pelagians should have accused Augustine of reintroducing the heathen conception of Fate—an accusation which he repudiates with a half-admission that it is not totally groundless.² There is no struggling against a force which represents all the might of omnipotence, directed by all the intellectual resources of omniscience. God is in the position of a chess-player, gifted with telepathic and hypnotic power of an infinitely high degree, who not merely foresees all the other player’s moves, but actually himself makes them, acting through the other’s mind and brain, and who consequently has won the game before it has even begun. The ideas of absolute election *ante præuisa merita* (that is, not grounded upon the foreseen merits of the elect persons)³ and of irresistible grace reciprocally imply and

¹ *Serm.* xcix, 6. Augustine’s *Confessions* abound with illustrations of the part played by exterior Providence in shaping his own life.

² *C. ii epp. Pel.* ii, 9–12, cf. 9, “nor do we assert Fate under the name of Grace, when we maintain that God’s grace is not preceded by any human merits. If, however, it pleases certain persons to describe the will of Almighty God as ‘Fate’, we shun profane novelties of words, but do not care to dispute about terms.”

³ Augustine explicitly repudiates predestination *post merita*, i.e. the theory that God predestines certain persons to eternal life because, and only because, He foresees that they will in fact make good use of free will: cf. *c. Iul. Pel.* v, 14. Lest the elect might be deemed to

necessitate each other: and, whilst the former can claim to derive some Scriptural support from Augustine's favourite chapter of the Epistle to the Romans (ix), and the latter from two other, continuously recurring, proof-texts—"what hast thou that thou didst not receive?"¹ and "It is God who worketh in you both to will and to work for his good pleasure,"² both are ultimately rooted in the feeling of his own worthlessness and helplessness which is the temperamental heritage of the twice-born saint.

What, then, of human free will? The answer seems simple enough at first sight: real freedom of choice cannot exist in fallen man, for his will is invariably determined by concupiscence, nor yet in the elect, for in them the will is moulded (or, to employ Augustine's favourite euphemism, "prepared")³ by grace. This latter position is articulated and defined as against the semi-Pelagians by the celebrated distinction between *prevenient* and *subsequent* grace, the former being the initial impulse which comes solely from God and without which man cannot even begin to raise himself out of the mire of his sins, the latter being the divine energy which accompanies and inspires each individual good act after conversion.⁴ Augustine's real view seems to emerge in a sentence of the *Retractations*, referring to his exposition of Romans ix, 10 ff, "in this inquiry

¹ I Cor. iv, 7.

² Phil. ii, 13.

³ Cf. *De prædest. sanct.* v, 10: [The Pelagian contradicts St. Paul] "not because to believe or not believe is not in the power of free will, but because in the elect the will is prepared by the Lord." The phrase is derived from Proverbs viii, 35, LXX—*ἐτοιμάζεται θέλησις παρὰ Κυρίου*

⁴ This distinction is sometimes described as that between *operant* and *co-operant* grace.

have been elected before the foundation of the world as the result of foreseen works, the Apostle immediately adds, "And if by grace, then is it no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace": and *de præd. sanct.* xviii, 36. "God chose us . . . not because we were in fact going to be [holy], but in order that we might be [holy]." (*non quia futuri eramus, sed ut essemus*).

we laboured indeed on behalf of human free will: *but* the grace of God won the day.”¹ Yet—paradoxical though it may seem—Augustine never admitted that he had denied free will either to the unregenerate or to the elect: he believed to the end that he had succeeded in reconciling absolute predestination and human liberty, and, whilst preaching on the apparently predestinarian text, “No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him,”² could rhetorically exclaim, “Art thou not yet drawn? pray that thou mayest be” (*nondum traheris? ora ut traharis*).³ Dom O. Rottmanner⁴ has collected a number of such exhortations, which have been, perhaps ill-naturedly, caricatured in the mock-Augustinian maxim—“*si non es prædestinatus, fac ut prædestineris*”: “if you are not predestined, get yourself predestined”.

In order to realise the extraordinary refinement and subtlety of the ecclesiastical concept of grace, in the mind which first formulated it, we cannot remind ourselves too forcibly that Augustine did not reluctantly concede the freedom of the will, but enthusiastically proclaimed and vindicated it. His anti-Manichæan treatises are storehouses of arguments for the reality of that power of choice which we instinctively believe ourselves to possess:⁵ and even in the stress of the Pelagian controversy, he could still assert “where necessity is, there can be no crown (as the reward of free choice)”.⁶ It is true that Adam alone of mankind possessed a perfectly equilibrated will, and that only before the Fall: it is true that in fallen man the will is now hampered and circumscribed by the tyranny of the passions, so that heart-breaking effort is needed to over-

¹ *Retract.* ii, 1. The treatise referred to is *ad Simplic.* i.

² St. John vi, 44.

³ *In Ioann. ev.* xxvi, 1.

⁴ *Der Augustinismus*, p. 29.

⁵ Cf. especially *de lib. arbitr.* iii: *de duab. animab.* xi, 15: *c. Faust. man.* XII, xcvi.

⁶ *De nat. et grat.* lxxv, 78. Cf. also *de pecc. merit. et rem.* II, xviii, 28. *De grat. Christi et de pecc. or.* I, xlvii, 52.

come them. Nevertheless, our freedom is real, though limited: to believe or not to believe, to welcome or to reject God's call, is within our own power, and belongs to the exercise of that God-given responsibility which could not be eradicated from our personality without destroying it. "Consentire autem uocationi Dei uel dissentire propriæ uoluntatis est."¹ The human chess-player (to recur to the simile employed before) invariably does what the Divine player wishes him to do: but he does it of his own accord.

The ingenious schematism within which Augustine claimed to have brought the *prima facie* incompatible ideas (a) of an eternally closed list of the elect, a *numerus neque augendus neque minuendus*, and (b) of the individual's freedom, here and now, to accept or not to accept salvation, has been summarised by M. Portalié in words which cannot be bettered, and which shall be quoted at length:

"The solution [of the problem of grace and free will] rests upon three Augustinian theories.

"I. *Theory of the psychology of the Will.* The will never decides without a motive, without the attraction of some good perceived to inhere in its object, 'uoluntatem non allicit ad faciendum quodlibet nisi aliquod uisum', says Augustine: 'quid autem quisque uel sumat uel respuat, est in potestate.'² Now, whilst the will is free in face of any motive, in fact it often takes resolutions differing in accordance with the diverse motives which are presented to it. Here resides the secret of the influence exercised by eloquence (the orator can do no more than present motives), by meditation or by good reading. What a power over the will would not be possessed by one who could at his pleasure present to it, at any moment, this or that motive for action! But such *is* the privilege of God, in virtue of a second principle, namely:

¹ *De spir. et lit.* xxxiv, 60. cf. *ep.* ccxvii (*ad Vital.*) v, 16, "we know that those who with their own heart believe in the Lord do so by their own will and free choice".

² *De lib. arbitr.* II, xxv, 74.

"2. *Theory of the psychology of the intellect.* St. Augustine has observed this fact of universal experience, that man is *not master of his first thoughts*: he can influence the course of his reflections, but he cannot himself determine the objects, the images, or (consequently) the *motives* which occur to his mind. *Nemo habet in potestate quid ei ueniat in mentem: sed consentire uel dissentire propriæ uoluntatis est.*¹ Now, as 'chance' is only a word, it is God who determines at His will these first perceptions of men, whether by the providentially prepared action of exterior causes, or interiorly by the ministry of angels or even by a divine illumination bestowed upon the soul.²

"The divine influence upon man's will thus already appears exceedingly potent, inasmuch as it is entirely in God's discretion to draw the will this way or that by presenting to it this one or that of the motives or attractive thoughts which are at the disposal of His infinite resourcefulness. Nevertheless, the action of the divine influence, though powerful, would—owing to man's freedom of choice—be uncertain and contingent, but for a third element, which is described in:

"3. *Theory of the Divine Knowledge.* Augustine adds that God not merely sends at His pleasure the illuminations and attractions which inspire the will with its determinations; but also, before choosing out of the whole range of possible illuminations and attractions those which He intends to send to a given soul, *knows* the exact response which that soul, *in the exercise of perfect liberty*, would make to each one of these possible illuminations and attractions. Corresponding to every created will, therefore, there exists in the treasury of the Divine knowledge the idea of an indefinite series of motives towards good which, at a given moment, would in fact, though freely, be rejected by that will: as also the idea of another series of motives which in fact, though always with perfect liberty, would be accepted by it. God can, then, if He so pleases, ensure that Judas shall

¹ *De spir. et. lit.* xxxiv, 60.

² Cf. *de Gen. ad litt.* ix, 14, 25, a very characteristic passage.

voluntarily embrace salvation,¹ and that Peter shall *voluntarily* go down to perdition;² no liberty can resist His plans, though liberty retains always the power of damning itself. Consequently, it is *God alone* who, in His uncontrolled discretion, determines (by His choice of this or that motive or inspiration, of which He unerringly knows the future influence) whether the will is to decide for good or for evil. It follows that the man who has acted well ought to thank God for having sent him an inspiration Divinely foreseen as certain to be efficacious, especially in view of the fact that this favour has been refused to other men. *A fortiori*, every one of the elect owes it simply to the Divine goodness that he has received the series of graces which God foresaw to be certainly, though freely, bound up with final perseverance.”³

To this account certain elucidations and amplifications may appropriately be added.

First, it must be observed that Augustine makes no differentiation between grace as conferred through the sacraments and grace as bestowed immediately upon the soul by God through interior illumination or by the providential operation of circumstance. Whatever the mode of its impartation, “grace” is one and the selfsame thing, namely (in the strictest sense), the saving Will of God directed towards the ultimate glorification of His elect, or (in a somewhat looser sense) the invisible help whereby He “prepares” the wills of the elect in order that they may produce meritorious works. Augustine undoubtedly held a high sacramental view of the efficacy both of baptism and of

¹ Cf. *de nat. et grat.* vii, 8: “quia enim Dominus Lazarum suscitavit, sine dubio potuit: quia uero Iudam non suscitavit, numquid dicendum est, non potuit? Potuit ergo, sed noluit.”

² That is, God could have suggested to Judas motives towards good of such a kind that he would have freely consented to be guided by them, and to Peter motives which he would have with equal freedom rejected: though in fact He chose in both instances to pursue the opposite policy to this.

³ Vacant et Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de theologie catholique*, i, 2389–90, art. *Augustin*.

the Eucharist: and he would probably have considered it a sufficient reply to modern criticisms of the idea of sacramental grace as “un-ethical” and “mechanical”, if such criticisms had been put forward in his day, to point out that if they are valid at all they are as valid against the belief in grace imparted directly by God in answer to prayer as against the notion of grace bestowed through or in necessary connection with external rites.

Secondly, Augustine must be credited with the fact that, although much in his writings attributes an irresistible cogency to grace, when he devotes any extended discussion to the question of its interior *modus operandi* this is always described as proceeding by way of infallible attraction, not of overmastering compulsion. God gently leads the elect to desire and pursue goodness by presenting the idea of virtue to them under the most beautiful and seductive guise, and by revealing Himself in some measure, albeit imperfect, of His eternal loveliness and glory. The thought corresponds in the moral and religious sphere to that enunciated by Aristotle in regard to the sphere of cosmology, namely, that the ultimate Being, which is God, moves the universe as being the object of its love,¹ a *dictum* with which Augustine may well have been acquainted: and it is illustrated by the naïve yet gracious images of children who are attracted to their lessons by the promise of nuts, and of the sheep whose shepherd tempts it into the right path by the offer of a green bough.² This line of thought enables Augustine to insist upon the reality of man’s free will, even when subjected to the influence of grace: for, although God foresees that in fact such and such an inspiration will prove efficacious—in other words, that it will be accepted and followed, He does not compel the recipient to follow it, or annul his power to reject it. In Portalie’s phrase “[the Divine] foreknowledge has no more effect upon the future than [human] memory has upon the

¹ *Met. A. 7* (1072b): *κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον*

² *In Ioann. xxvi, 5.*

past". When, however, Augustine is asked why God has not chosen to bestow inspirations foreseen as sure to be efficacious upon everyone, he can only take refuge in the mystery which shrouds all the operations of the Divine Being. "If anyone drives us into a corner, and compels us to peer into the abyss of this question, why one man is so advised [by God] that he is in fact persuaded (*cur illi ita suadeatur ut persuadeatur*), but another is not so advised, only two replies occur to me as appropriate at the present juncture 'O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God!' and 'Is there unrighteousness with God?'"¹ And it may be noted that one element, and that the ultimately decisive one, in the totality of Divine influences and operations which make up "grace" does in any case work in a manner which is independent of human consent or volition—namely, the providential arrangement which ensures that the death of an elect individual shall take place at a given moment, when it is foreseen that he will be in a state of grace, and not before (when he might not yet have attained to that state) or after (when he might have lost it).²

Thirdly, it is desirable to emphasise the fact that Augustine is the real author, not merely of the celebrated distinction between "prevenient" and "co-operant" grace, mentioned above, but also of the equally celebrated and even more subtle distinction between "sufficient" and "efficacious" grace. It is true that he does not himself employ these terms, which originated in the later scholasticism: but it will conduce to lucidity if we may be permitted to indulge in a convenient anachronism by employing them with reference to Augustine's own conceptions. This distinction can be best explained by recurring for a moment to our image of mankind, as viewed by

¹ *De spir. et litt.* xxxiv, 60. Cf. also *de Gen. ad litt.* xi, 13; "sed posset [Deus] . . . etiam ipsorum [sc. malorum] uoluntatem in bonum conuertere, quia omnipotens est. Posset plane. Cur ergo non fecit? Quia noluit. Cur noluerit, penes ipsum est."

² Cf. *de don. pers.* ix, 22.

Augustine, under the form of two concentric circles surrounding an inner circle or nucleus. The outermost of these, it will be remembered, represents those who are left by God's inscrutable judgement in the "mass of perdition", still subject to the guilt of the primal sin (i.e. non-Christians), who receive no grace at all or only that inferior kind which is appropriate to the "sons of concubines", and whose inevitable end is eternal torment with the devil and his angels. The next innermost represents those who are foreordained to become Christians, though it is foreseen that they will in fact backslide and so fail to attain eternal salvation: the nucleus is the elect, those who are predestined not merely to be Christians but also to receive the gift of final perseverance, and so to reach their perfect consummation both of soul and body in heaven. What is the difference between the kind of grace received by Christians who are predestined to relapse into the "mass of perdition", and that bestowed upon those who are foreordained to persevere unto the end? Augustine cannot reply simply that there is no difference—that the same grace is bestowed upon all Christians, but that some make better use of it than others: for that would be to admit human free will to a function co-ordinate with that of Divine grace in procuring salvation, whereas it is vital to his whole position as against the Pelagians to maintain that all comes from God, that man is totally and unreservedly dependent on his Maker for every good thing, including the right use of free will, that the salvation of any given soul is God's work and only God's from first to last. There must, therefore, be a difference in the *kind* of grace bestowed upon non-elect and elect Christians respectively—no one dare say, in the *amount*, for it cannot be supposed that God mocks any of His human creatures by offering them a little grace, but not really enough to enable them to save themselves. The nature of this difference can be gathered from the terms used to describe the two classes of the baptized—the elect being "called according to purpose" or "called congruously" (that is, in a manner congruous with

their individual temperaments and characters), the non-elect being "called incongruously", or "not according to purpose". And the kinds of grace which they respectively receive are styled (a) in the case of the elect, "the help by which [they are saved]" (*adiutorium quo*), and (b) in the case of the non-elect "the help without which [it would be theoretically impossible for them to be saved]" (*adiutorium sine quo non*).¹ In a general sense, God desires all men, or at least all Christians, to be saved, and therefore He gives to all Christians the *adiutorium sine quo non*, or "sufficient grace" (that is, sufficient to save themselves by, if they choose to accept and utilise it): but also He has decreed, in His unsearchable counsels, that only certain individuals shall be saved, and He therefore reserves for them the *adiutorium quo*, or "efficacious grace", which is not merely sufficient to save the recipient, if accepted, but also has the unique property of inducing its recipient to accept it. This property, the presence of which makes grace to be "efficacious" and the absence of which makes it to be merely "sufficient", consists, as will have been gathered, precisely in congruity or appropriateness to the recipient's predispositions. Hence the apparent paradox that the recipients of merely "sufficient" grace are invariably lost, because although sufficient in amount this grace is always incongruous in quality, and therefore is always (with perfect freedom) rejected by those upon whom it is bestowed. "Efficacious grace", on the other hand, is never resisted in fact, though in theory it might be, because of the infinite resourcefulness and the delicate precision with which it is adapted to the character of the receiver.

The nature of the distinction between "sufficient" and "efficacious" grace may be made clearer by an illustration which is not indeed found in Augustine's writings, but which I

¹ For the distinction between *adiutorium quo* and *adiutorium sine quo non* see *de corr. et grat.* xii, 34; for that between *congruenter* and *non congruenter uocati*, see *ad Simpl.* i, 13: and for that between *secundum propositum uocati* (the phrase is taken from Rom. viii, 28) and *non secundum propositum uocati*, c. ii *ep. Pel.* ii, 10, 22.

venture to think is a not unfair translation into concrete terms of the principles which he has formulated. Imagine that the congregation assembled in a certain parish church to listen to a visiting preacher includes two men, A and B, both baptized Christians, and both subject to temptations so violent that every now and then the issue as between yielding and resisting hangs in the balance: suppose further that on this particular occasion each has come to a crisis in his life, of which the result will decide his future path, whether towards heaven or hell: and add the further supposition that A is a rough, uneducated, coarse-fibred man, and B a refined and sensitive scholar. Let us assume, on Augustinian principles, that (although neither of the persons concerned is aware of the fact) God has in His secret counsels fore-ordained B to eternal life, and passed over A—that, for millions of years before either A or B existed, B's name had been standing in the eternally closed list of the elect, and A's had been absent therefrom. The immutability of God's predestination compels Him to ensure that His decree shall be exactly carried out and that A and B shall eventually arrive in hell and heaven respectively. On the other hand, His justice equally forbids Him to over-ride either A's or B's freedom of choice: and His benevolence forbids Him to leave either without grace which, if accepted and utilised, would be at least sufficient to procure his salvation. He therefore secures His end in the following manner. We have assumed that A is a "rough diamond", in whom good resolutions are most likely to be evoked by revivalistic preaching of the crudest type, with vivid appeals to fear and realistic pictures of judgement to come. Divine Providence, therefore, by its invisible control of the course of events arranges that the preacher on this particular occasion shall be of a highly intellectual and philosophical type of mind, who is incapable of producing lurid and popular oratory, and whose discourse in fact, though deeply spiritual and full of unction, is devoted to the praise of virtue as an end in itself, and to extolling the austere, impersonal majesty of the

“categorical imperative”. So far as A is concerned, accordingly, the sermon falls flat. Objectively regarded, it has conveyed grace to him: for, *ex hypothesi*, it has put before him high and noble considerations, and was instinct with sincerity and spiritual power. But the grace was “incongruous”, that is, conveyed through ideas not adapted to his intellect or idiosyncrasy. He therefore makes no effort to assimilate the “sufficient” grace offered him through the sermon and takes no steadfast resolution to overcome his temptations, though, theoretically, he might have done both: he leaves the church, yields to mortal sin, is almost immediately thereafter killed in a (providentially arranged) street accident, and consequently goes down to hell—thus freely, though unwittingly, conforming with terrible exactitude to the eternal decree which from the beginning had fore-ordained his perdition. In the case of B, on the other hand, the sermon was exactly appropriate to the listener’s temperament, and the grace conveyed through it was, accordingly, “efficacious” grace, which we may suppose that he gladly welcomed and which assisted him to fortify his will and set his face like a flint against the solicitations of unlawful desire. If death overtakes him in this frame of mind, the grace received through the sermon will in fact have included the grace of final perseverance, which is the passport to eternal bliss. A and B thus inevitably fulfil their predestined courses to their infinitely diverse ends, though each has had offered to him grace sufficient, if properly used, to ensure salvation, and neither’s freedom of choice has been in any way prejudiced or impaired.

Whether or not this scheme may be deemed successfully to reconcile the *prima facie* opposition which exists between divine grace and human free will, metaphysically considered, it is clear that it totally fails to remove the moral difficulties implicit in the conception of an “eternally closed list” of the elect, drawn up by God in eternity without any reference to the future conduct or merits of those whose names appear in it.

The distinction between the "preterition" of the non-elect (that is, their being left in the "mass of perdition" and allowed to damn themselves automatically) and the idea of positive "reprobation" is a distinction without a difference, which in no way saves the universal love of God; if I deliberately leave a man to drown in a canal when I might have pulled him out, I am morally just as guilty of homicide as if I had pushed him in. Nor is this disastrous consequence circumvented by the expedient of "sufficient grace"; it would be useless and hypocritical for me to plead that I did actually throw the man a rope, if for reasons of my own I desired him to drown, and therefore was careful to select a rope which I knew was too fragile to bear this particular man's weight. In the light of these considerations it may appear astonishing that the conception of "sufficient grace" should ever have appeared a possible basis for a theodicy, though it is still maintained by the "Thomist" school of theologians within the Latin Communion—a fact which will claim further consideration at a later stage of our inquiry. Meanwhile, this brief sketch of the Augustinian system of grace may be completed by a few words relative to the part played in it by a conception which has had a considerable influence upon the subsequent development of ecclesiastical polity and practice—the conception of "merit".

Strictly speaking it would seem as impossible to work the conceptions of irresistible grace and of human merit into a single logical, coherent system as to mix oil and water; and so at a later date the Reformers proclaimed in no uncertain tones. For not merely is the attribution of all our good deeds to the sole operation of God incompatible with the ascription to ourselves of any sort of credit for them, but the idea of merit belongs to a different plane, a different universe of discourse, from that in which the idea of "grace" is at home. Regarded *ex parte Dei*, "grace" is a metaphysical concept; regarded *ex parte hominis* it belongs to the domain of psychology. But "merit" belongs in the last resort to the sphere of economics;

it is, in blunt terms, the cash-value attaching to a given product, namely, "good works", and to pass from "grace" to "merit" involves what Aristotle called a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*, a "transition into another kind of thinking". However, the conception of merit was already too deeply rooted in the tradition of the Church, and indeed in the Scriptures themselves, for Augustine to be able to discard it. The idea of the merits of the Patriarchs as a source of the spiritual vitality of the Church underlies the simile of the olive tree in Romans xi, 16-24; and the Apostle of grace himself had declared that God "will render to every man according to his works",¹ and that "if any man's works shall abide, which he built" (on the "foundation") "he shall receive a reward".² The Epistle to the Hebrews affirms "he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is the rewarder of them that seek after Him";³ and St. James insists upon the meritoriousness of good works in terms which almost seem to disparage the value of faith—"as the body apart from the spirit is dead, even so faith apart from works is dead".⁴ The local tradition of the African Church, too, which naturally exercised a powerful influence upon the Bishop of Hippo, assigned a high value to the merits of confessors and martyrs; which were even capable of being transferred to and of availing for those who had no merits of their own, as the venerable Cyprian had recognised. Moreover, Augustine's insistence that he has in no way abolished free will, compels him to find a place for merit somewhere in his system. He cannot, indeed, admit that fallen man can merit the first grace, the grace of conversion, or that God's predestination of the elect is determined by their foreseen merits.⁵ But a logical

¹ Rom. ii, 6.

² 1 Cor. iii, 14.

³ Heb. xi, 6.

⁴ St. James ii, 26.

⁵ Augustine admits that before he became a bishop he had held both these opinions, viz. the non-necessity of "prevenient grace" and "predestination *post merita*": see *de prædest.* 7 and *retract.* II, i, 1.

crevice into which the idea of merit can be inserted is found between the "good works" which the elect produce in virtue of the grace which they receive and the attainment of "eternal life". The good works of the justified are truly meritorious — that is to say, they entitle their performers *in justice* to eternal life; though the title to eternal life thus established may always, of course, be cancelled by subsequent sin, and is in fact only operative in the case of those who have been predestined to receive the gift of final perseverance. Strictly speaking, therefore, God has not so much predestined His favourites to eternal life as predestined them to receive efficacious graces which will enable them to produce good works which will merit eternal life. The reality which Augustine attributes to merit under these conditions is illustrated by such passages as the following: "As death is the wages owing to the merit of sin, so eternal life is the wages owing to the merit of righteousness";¹ and, "Eternal life is that reward in the promise of which we rejoice, nor can a reward precede merits or be given to man before he is worthy of it. For what would be more unjust than such a procedure, and what is more just than God? We ought not, therefore, to ask for our reward before we have deserved to receive it."² Yet in the last resort this recognition of human merit is no more than nominal; "God does not crown thy merits as being thy merits, but as being His own gifts."³ Augustine's first and last word on the relation of free will (of which, if it exists, "merit" is merely the by-product and symptom) to divine grace is summed up in the famous prayer wrung from him by the agonies of his own interior struggle: "Da quod iubes, et iube quod uis" — "Give what thou dost command, and command what thou wilt."

Although much in Augustine's thought is naturally inchoate

¹ *Ep.* cxciv, 20.

² *De mor. eccl., cath.* I, xxv, 47.

³ *De grat. et lib. arb.* 15. (The phrase is repeated *ep.* cxciv, 19.) Cf. also *Confess.* ix, 13, 34. "He who enumerates his own true merits, what does he enumerate unto thee other than thine own gifts?"

and undeveloped in respect of detail, it is nevertheless true to say that in his writings we find the ecclesiastical concept of grace substantially complete, at any rate as regards its main outlines. It is not, indeed, as we have shown, identical in content with the idea which St. Paul means to denote by the term "grace"; but, if it stands for a reality, it is none the worse for that, though it must be admitted that this difference between Biblical and ecclesiastical terminologies is attended by certain practical inconveniences. Nevertheless the ecclesiastical sense of the term "grace", as meaning God's healing power or salvific will, has rooted itself too deeply in popular use and acceptance ever to be dispossessed; and the term will accordingly be used in the following pages, without any further explanation, in this sense. It will conduce to lucidity in our description of subsequent developments if we conclude this chapter with a brief formulation of the chief problems to which this conception gives rise.

These problems are of two kinds—those of a philosophical character, raising grave issues as to the nature of God and of man and of the relations between them, and those which are rather of an historical character, springing out of the actual circumstances and conditions of the Christian dispensation. The former seem to be six in number, namely:

1. What ontological account can be given of "grace"? Is it a substance, a quality, a power or a person?

2. What is the relation of grace to (a) God's *concursum generalis* or "general concurrence" with all events without exception, which the belief in divine immanence compels us to assume; (b) with His particular control of human destinies, which is usually known as His "special providence"; (c) with the supernormal mode of His activity known as "miracle"?

3. What is the exact relation to and effect upon human free will of the rain of Divine influences summed up under the name of "grace"? Is it possible to imagine a grace which is supernatural and real, but not irresistible?

4. Must the appeal of grace be conceived as addressed solely to the conscious mind and reason, or is it legitimate to postulate supernatural influences which operate in the region of the unconscious?

5. What state of human nature is pre-supposed by the doctrine of the universal necessity of grace? Are we to regard man, apart from grace, as morally dead, paralysed, ailing or sound?

6. How are we to explain the apparently unequal distribution of grace in this life? Are we to ground it upon an arbitrary predestination *ante merita*? or are we to affirm that the inequality is apparent only, that God gives all men grace sufficient to ensure their salvation, that the different results which issue therefrom are due to the different choices made by individuals, and that the idea of predestination, if retained at all, can only be conceived as predestination *post praevisa merita*?

Under the latter head two main questions arise, namely:

1. What is the relation of "grace" to the Person and Work of Christ, that is to the ideas of the Incarnation and the Atonement, and to the Holy Spirit?

2. In what sense may grace be said to be conveyed through the Church and the Sacraments? and can grace, in that sense in which it is to be distinguished from God's *concursus generalis* and His "special providence", be restricted to the employment of these external means?

Two other problems, which belong rather to the margin than to the centre of the subject inevitably suggest themselves in the course of reflection upon it, namely:

1. Is the conception of "merit" worth preserving? And if so, can it in any way be harmonised with the conception of "grace"?

2. The object of grace is to ensure salvation, and salvation pre-supposes something to be saved from, that is, eternal death. Is this to be conceived as an eternity of woe or as annihilation?

The reader will remember our warning that complete

answers to these profound questions must not be looked for within the pages of a comparatively brief essay or indeed in any of the existing treatises on the subject, however voluminous; but their formulation will, it may be hoped, provide him with a guiding thread which may preserve him from losing himself in the labyrinth of subsequent controversies.

SYNERGISM

IT is a curious fact that the development of the ecclesiastical concept of grace has been closely associated with monasticism. Augustine, its chief artificer, lived a life of regular observance in a community constituted by the priests attached to his episcopal residence; and several Orders, both male and female, in the Western Church still bear his name and follow what is known as his "Rule".¹ Pelagius, on the other hand, the champion of the ultra-rationalist view of grace, was also a monk, though not a cœnobite (i.e. not one living in community). And the writer who now claims our attention, as being, if not the originator, at least the most conspicuous primitive champion of a mediating theory, like his two predecessors spent the greater part of his life within the cloister—John Cassian, who was born about A.D. 360 and died in 435. This illustrious Father was thus a contemporary of St. Augustine (who died in A.D. 430); his youth was spent in a monastery at Bethlehem, he devoted ten years (A.D. 385–95) to the study of Egyptian monasticism in the desert of Scete, and in 415 he founded twin monasteries for men and women at Marseilles, which he governed until his death. Before settling in the West he had been closely associated with St. John Chrysostom, from whose hands he received the diaconate; and this acquaintanceship would doubtless incline him, to a certain extent, in favour of the Antiochene theology, which laid great stress upon our

¹ The so-called "Rule" of St. Augustine is an adaptation of a letter (*ep.* ccxxi) of general direction and guidance, which he wrote in A.D. 423 to a community of women at Hippo.

Lord's true humanity and the reality of the moral example afforded by His conquest over temptation, and was consequently disposed, in accordance with the tradition of Hellenic Christianity, to insist upon the genuineness of man's freedom of choice—in its more extreme form, as represented by Nestorius, carrying this tendency to the point of an apparent endorsement of Pelagianism. Cassian's sympathies, however, were strictly controlled by reason, and six years before his death he wrote a treatise *On the Incarnation of Christ* against the erring successor of Chrysostom. The two works by which he is best known are the *Institutiones*, containing rules and counsel regarding the exterior aspect of the monastic life, and the *Collationes*, which deal with its interior spirit in a series of dialogues purporting to represent conferences between Cassian and his friend Germanus on the one side, and the great ascetics of Egypt on the other. This latter work was so highly esteemed by St. Benedict that its continuous study is enjoined in his Rule,¹ and it exercised an enormous influence over the development of the religious life during the Middle Ages. Though his divergence from the dominant Augustinianism of the Western Church has invested his memory with a certain cloud of suspicion, he was nevertheless honoured with the title of "Saint" by at least two popes,² and he has always enjoyed a local cultus in his own city of Marseilles, where his feast is celebrated on July 23rd.

In sketching Cassian's doctrine of grace it is necessary in the first instance to emphasise the fact that he neither was nor intended to be a Pelagian. With a clarity of perception remarkable in one who lived in the midst of the controversies with which he deals, he points out, in his work against Nestorius, the logical connection between Nestorianism and Pelagianism—between the Christology which regards the Saviour as an

¹ C. xlii.

² St. Gregory the Great, *ep. ad Respectam*, PL LXXII, 866: Urban V, *Gallia christiana*, I, p. 118.

inspired man, differing from other men only in respect of the degree of moral union with the Word of God to which he had attained, and consequently "saving" his fellows only by virtue of the instruction which he gives and the ethical example which he provides, and the anthropology which proclaims that human nature is essentially sound, endowed with unhampered and unlimited free will, and needing no more than moral instruction and a good example in order to be able to save itself.¹ Cassian has been called the father of "semi-Pelagianism", but it would be fairer to describe the system which he advocated as "semi-Augustinianism"; for with regard to most of the chief points in dispute he was far nearer to the Bishop of Hippo than to the heresiarch of Britain. He accepts without question the Augustinian belief in the fatal consequences of the sin of Adam, as not merely disorganising human nature in such a way that all human beings are born subject to a congenital hypertrophy of appetite and atrophy of will-power, but also as involving them in the guilt of, or judicial responsibility for, his sin, in view of the (supposed) fact that they were all physically included in him at the moment when he committed it; in technical language, he assumes the ideas of "original sin", "seminal identity", and "original guilt".² Similarly also he affirms the universal necessity of the assistance of Divine grace for the performance of every good act. But the idea of the *irresistibility* of grace, which makes of human volition a mere mode of the self-expression of the divine Will, and its corollary, the belief in absolute predestination without regard to foreseen merit, were profoundly uncongenial to his robust ethical common sense. Augustine's treatise *On Rebuke and Grace*, in which these ideas are developed with remorseless logic, seems to have aroused strong opposition in the monasteries of Southern Gaul. (It is singular that two great seaports, Marseilles and Carthage,

¹ *De incarn. Christi*, i, 3.

² For an exposition of these conceptions, see the author's *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*.

facing each other across the waters of the Western Mediterranean, should have been providentially selected as the homes of two clearly defined and divergent doctrines with regard to this mysterious subject.) Two disciples of Augustine, Prosper of Aquitaine and a certain Hilary, reported to their master that the "Massilian school", as they called it, maintained that the Fall had left a man a certain small capacity for exerting effort in the direction of goodness, even apart from grace, that the beginnings of a good will rest with ourselves, that Christ died for all men and not merely for the elect, and that the doctrine of absolute predestination destroys the possibility of serious moral preaching, inasmuch as it is waste of time to exhort a congregation to repentance and amendment of life if God has already determined by an unalterable decree which of its component individuals actually will repent and amend their lives and which will not.¹ This report called forth Augustine's two treatises, which have been already noticed in our review of his system, *On the Predestination of the Saints* and *On the Gift of Perseverance*.² These stringent re-affirmations of uncompromising Augustinianism were not calculated to remove the apprehensions of Cassian and his sympathisers, and "Semi-Pelagianism" became, for the time being, the characteristic doctrine of Provence: the *Commonitorium* of Vincent (d. ? c. A.D. 434) monk of the island monastery of Lerins, which rises out of the sea a few miles off the Riviera coast, enunciates the famous principle, that that alone is truly Catholic which has been believed "everywhere, always, and by all" (*ubique, semper et ab omnibus*), as a weapon, not merely against avowed heresy, but against the African theories which appeared to be taking the rest of Western Christendom by storm.³

¹ *Epp.* 225, 226 *inter Augustinianas*.

² These two treatises are in reality merely two sections of a single work.

³ Anti-Augustinian polemic is hardly concealed in *Commonitor.* xxvi, 69.

The character of this milder doctrine of Grace which we have associated with the name of Cassian may be exhibited most clearly by a few citations from the *Collations*. In the third book, which purports to represent a conversation with Paphnutius, the ninety-year-old Abbot of Scete, Germanus, puts the following problem: "If God both begins and completes in us all things which belong to our perfection, in what does free will consist, and how can the merit of our virtue be ascribed to our own efforts?" The aged anchorite replies: "You might reasonably have been puzzled by this question, if every work and every process of self-training consisted merely of a beginning and an end, without any intermediate stages. But as we know that God in diverse manners brings about for us occasions of salvation, so it is in our power to utilise the occasions granted to us by the Divine Will with energy or with remissness.

For as the call of God 'Get thee out of thy country' represents the offer of an opportunity, so Abraham's going forth represented his own obedience; and just as the command 'Come into the land' required obedient effort on the part of him that heard it in order that it might come to pass, so also the following phrase, 'Which I will shew unto thee' represents the grace of God Who commands or promises. Nevertheless, we ought to be most firmly convinced of this, that, however unwearying the efforts with which we practise every kind of virtue, we can never attain to perfection through our own diligence or zeal, nor is human industry sufficient by the merit of its labours to reach the transcendent rewards of everlasting blessedness, unless we shall have attained them through the Lord's co-operating with us and directing our heart towards that which is right. And so at every moment in our prayers we ought to say with David 'O, hold thou up my goings in thy paths, that my footsteps slip not . . .' that the invisible Ruler of man's mind may vouchsafe to incline to the study of virtue that will of ours, which, whether it be through ignorance of the good or through the delight associated with the indulgence of

the passions, is only too ready to be borne headlong in the direction of vice . . . No one of the righteous is sufficient to himself for retaining righteousness [nor can he retain it], unless at every moment God in His mercy lends him the support of His hand as he totters and all but falls, lest he be precipitated to the ground and perish utterly, being betrayed by the weakness of his free will.”¹

It will be noticed that this passage affirms the universal necessity of grace as clearly as Augustine himself could have wished, but couples this with a certain admission of the co-operating power of human free will. This applies even to the first grace, the grace of conversion; God must indeed provide the opportunity and the call, but it rests with man to decide whether he will accept the opportunity and respond to the call, or not. And here we come upon the precise point of bifurcation at which the theology of Marseilles begins to travel away from that of Carthage. Augustine maintains that God not merely provides the opportunity of starting on the road to salvation, but operates in man the willingness to accept the opportunity, so that not the faintest and most elementary beginnings of man’s Godward aspirations arise from himself or have any other source except the arbitrarily bestowed and irresistible grace of God; and any attempt to assign to man even the most infinitesimal share in the work of his own salvation is remorselessly beaten down by the bludgeon of the great proof-text “What hast thou that thou didst not receive?”² For Augustine the first grace is strictly *prevenient*, for Cassian it is, like all other graces, *co-operant*. In one passage, indeed, Cassian appears to accept “*prevenient grace*”, in the Augustinian sense: “From which it can manifestly be concluded that the beginning not merely of good acts but of good thoughts comes from God, who inspires into us both the first rudiments of a good will and virtue itself, and also bestows upon us the opportunity of

¹ *Coll.* iii, 11, 12.

² 1 Cor. iv, 7.

performing those things which we rightly desire.”¹ This, however, must be read in the light of the vastly more numerous passages which attribute to man a real power of initiating in himself a Godward striving, such as the following—“When God sees us incline towards willing the good, He runs to meet us, directs and strengthens us . . . and again if He sees that we have lost our good will or have grown luke-warm, He brings salutary exhortations to bear upon our hearts whereby a good will is either restored or formed within us.”² The truth seems to be that Cassian held the “first grace”, or grace of conversion, to be strictly prevenient, that is, to burst into the life catastrophically and, as it were, miraculously, without any preceding effort or wish on the part of the man himself, in cases of *sudden* conversion, as in the cases of St. Matthew, who, he thinks, had never previously felt even the faintest wish to abandon a life of shameless extortion, and of St. Paul, who was instantaneously transformed from a persecutor into a pillar of the Church; but that in the ordinary and more numerous cases of conversion, of which the repentances of Zacchæus and of the Penitent Thief may be taken as typical, the “first grace” is co-operant, coming to the aid of feeble aspirations and velleities which are spontaneous or uncaused motions of the human will.³ This double possibility is expressed in the following sentence: “When God’s loving kindness has perceived even the tiniest spark of good will to have kindled within us, or when He Himself has smitten such a spark as it were out of the hard flint of our heart, He nurses it, and rouses it to a steady glow by His divine breath.”⁴ And this position, that the “first grace” is not always strictly prevenient is logically bound up with a view of the present state of fallen human nature perceptibly milder than that held by St. Augustine. It is not true to say that fallen

¹ *Coll.* xiii, 3.

² *Ibid.*, xiii, 11.

³ *Ibid.*, xiii, 11.

⁴ *Ibid.*, xiii, 7.

man can in his own strength will nothing but what is bad; on the contrary "we should not doubt that there exists in every soul by nature (*naturaliter*) the seeds of virtues planted there by the kindness of the Creator, though they cannot attain to the full blossom of perfection without the help of God".¹ Moreover, "there still remains in man" (even as fallen) "free will, which has the power either to neglect the grace of God or to welcome it with affection".² This view of grace naturally overthrows the whole structure of absolute predestinarianism, which presupposes both the irresistibility of grace and its arbitrary distribution. Cassian is therefore able to affirm that God genuinely wills the salvation of all men, and not merely of a small body of favourites selected before the foundation of the world for inscrutable or unintelligible reasons; and he observes, with, it would seem, a sidelong glance at the great bishop who ruled on the other side of the Mediterranean, "He whose will it is that not one of these little ones should perish—how without monstrous sacrilege shall it be thought that He does not will all men to be saved, but merely some in place of all?"³

Cassian's own views with regard to predestination are not clearly expressed; but it is clear from the report of Prosper and Hilary that the school of Marseilles in general held the doctrine of predestination *post præuisa merita*. There is, indeed, a list of the elect, known to God, and everyone whose name appears in that list has already had his mansion assigned to him in the heavenly Jerusalem; but this merely means that the divine foreknowledge, being infinite in its capacity and scope, is equal to the task of foreseeing what is strictly and essentially contingent, and, therefore, of foreseeing which members of the human race actually will respond to the grace offered them and so attain to salvation. In other words, predestination means no more than prevision; and Cassian could,

¹ *Coll.*, xiii, 12.

² *Ibid.*, xiii, 12.

³ *Ibid.*, xiii, 7.

much more easily than Augustine, endorse with regard to the finally lost the words placed by Milton in the mouth of the Almighty:

“They themselves decreed
Their own revolt, not I. If I foreknew,
Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault,
Which had no less proved certain, unforeknown.”¹

The three points on which Synergism diverges from strict Augustinianism thus stand out with clearness; they are:

(1) Its milder anthropology, which regards man as retaining in himself free will and the seeds of goodness, even after the Fall. It has been well said that Augustine regards human nature, prior to grace, as dead, Pelagius as sound and healthy, and Cassian as sick.

(2) Its denial of the necessity in all cases of strictly prevenient grace, though, as we have seen, Cassian admits the activity of this in remarkable instances of sudden conversion. He twice avails himself of Augustine's favourite proof-text, “What hast thou that thou didst not receive?” in order to establish the necessity of co-operant grace;² but he does not seem to meet the argument which uses it to enforce the necessity of prevenient grace as well. If he had dealt with the point, we may surmise that he would have admitted that the converted and justified man owes literally everything to God, but would have maintained that this is to be explained in the sense that the first faint stirrings and strivings of the will towards goodness are not directly caused by the special supernatural influence known as “grace”, but merely presuppose that *concursum generalis* of the Divine power which is involved in the fact that “in Him we live and move and have our being.” We may note that if Cassian had lived today he would have found himself relieved, or within sight of being relieved, from the necessity he felt of admitting prevenient grace in cases of

¹ *Paradise Lost*, iii, 116.

² *Inst.* xii, 10; *Coll.* ii, 16.

instantaneous conversion; for modern psychology has virtually abolished the distinction between gradual and instantaneous conversions, since the latter, when open to critical analysis, prove to have been preceded by a long period of subconscious incubation.

(3) Its reduction of predestination to prevision, and its wholehearted acceptance of the genuine universality of God's offer of redemption. On this point the school of Marseilles had a distinct advantage in the battle of proof-texts; for it was able to take at its face value the affirmation of 1 Timothy ii, 4, that God "willeth that all men should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth", whilst Augustine, with his theory that God willed only the salvation of the elect, when confronted with this text was obliged to take refuge in the lame explanation of it as meaning merely that God willed men of all sorts, of all nations and classes, to be found in the number of the elect. They do not, however, seem to have realised that a frank admission of the principle that all men can be saved if they choose must necessarily involve some modification of the stringency of the maxim *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*; for the greater portion of mankind is, and always has been, outside the Christian Church. The question was indeed raised as to the principles on which God deals with infants who die unbaptized but *ex hypothesi* in a state of personal innocence. According to Augustine's cruel theory, such infants are eternally damned on the sole ground of "original sin"; and the fact that some infants through no merits of their own escape this terrible doom by being brought to the font, whilst others do not, proves the inscrutability of God's predestination. Instead, however, of challenging Augustine's heartless premise, that the unbaptized are necessarily damned, the Massilians seem to have accepted it, and to have evaded the conclusion which he drew from it, by suggesting that the damnation of such infants was grounded upon the sins which God foresaw that they would have committed if they had been providentially permitted to live and to

approach the waters of regeneration—thus bringing the case of unbaptized children, at least formally, within the framework of predestination *post merita*: a wretched device which Augustine demolishes with ease.

It will be illuminating to quote the words in which the German theologian, Loofs, sums up his judgement of the "Semi-Pelagian" controversy: "Both sides, as well Augustine as his opponents, were partly in the right and partly in the wrong. But Augustine was more in the right than his adversaries. For as an expression of man's judgement of self in the presence of God the Augustinian doctrine is entirely accurate, and Semi-Pelagianism entirely false,¹ whilst as theological explanations of the phenomenon of conversion both views were erroneous—and necessarily erroneous, because both presuppose an erroneous conception of grace rooted in metaphysical assumptions, a conception which either abolishes every kind of human capacity for making a good decision or else abolishes itself."² On this, it may be observed: Firstly, that Augustine would not have admitted for a moment that his doctrines of human nature, sin and grace were no more than symbolic or pictorial expressions of the psychological experience of consciousness of guilt; for him, they were hard objective facts, vouched for by the unerring letter of Holy Scripture, and as such he would have demanded that they should be either "taken" or "left". Secondly, the typical character of the peculiarly passionate experiences of sin-consciousness and conversion on which the Augustinian doctrine is founded may well be disputed; I have argued elsewhere that "twice-born" men, such as were St. Paul and St. Augustine himself, are a small and highly specialised minority of mankind, and that the more equable experiences of the "once-born" temperament have an undeniable claim to have account taken of them in any modern re-formula-

¹ So also Harnack, *History of Dogma* (E. tr.), U. p. 221.

² *Leitfaden zum Studium der DG*, p. 438, n. 10

tion of the doctrine of "original sin"¹—a consideration which applies with equal force to the re-formulation of the conception of "grace". Thirdly, that Loofs' condemnation of the conception of grace which was common to both sides in the controversy at least confirms our contention that Cassian stood far nearer to Augustine than he did to Pelagius. The question whether Loofs is right in asserting that it is impossible to conceive grace as power without making it a strictly irresistible power will be discussed in the concluding sections of this essay.²

The history of the discussion during the rest of the fifth century can be studied in the standard text-books; we must now pass to the conciliar utterances which closed it for the time being, at any rate so far as Western Christendom was concerned. These are the Canons of the Second Council of Orange, held in A.D. 529 under the presidency of the Augustinian theologian, Cæsarius, Bishop of Arles; which, though attended only by thirteen other bishops and eight lay dignitaries, derived from its subsequent approbation by Pope Boniface II an authority of almost œcumenical weight in the eyes of Latin-speaking Christendom. (I have not been able to find any evidence that the Eastern Churches took any special notice of it; the Quini-Sextine Council of 692, which gives Eastern confirmation to the decrees of various local Western synods—including an unspecified Council of Carthage, which may or may not be that of 418—makes no mention of that of Orange.)³ We proceed to give the text of the most important of these Canons.⁴

Canon 1. "If anyone asserts that man as a whole, that is,

¹ See *The Ideas of the Fall of and Original Sin*, *passim*.

² It may be noted that St. Jerome, although a strong opponent of Pelagianism, nowhere defends the more rigid aspects of Augustinianism, and not infrequently uses expressions which imply a synergistic turn of mind: cf. *Dial.* ii, 6, "It does not belong *merely* to our own power to do what we wish but also to the mercy of God, if so be that He assists our will."

³ See Hardouin, iii, 166 oc.

⁴ These are conveniently collected in Denzinger-Bannwart, *Enchiridion*, § § 174 ff.

both as regards his body and soul, was not changed for the worse through the offence of Adam, but believes that his body alone became liable to corruption, the liberty of his soul remaining unimpaired—he is deceived by the error of Pelagius, and opposes the Scripture which says ‘The soul which sinneth it shall die,’ and ‘Know ye not, that to whom ye present yourselves as servants unto obedience, his servants ye are whom ye obey?’ and ‘Of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he also brought into bondage.’”

This appears to be a somewhat indefinite affirmation of the Augustinian doctrine of the Fall, though it noticeably abstains from determining too precisely the degree of deterioration suffered by human nature in consequence of the primal sin.

Canon 2. “If anyone asserts that the transgression of Adam injured only himself and not also his offspring—or that only the death of the body, which is the penalty of sin through one man passed unto the whole human race, and not also sin which is the death of the soul—he imputes unrighteousness to God and contradicts the Apostle when he says ‘through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin; and so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned’.”

Here the Augustinian conception of “original guilt” seems to be clearly implied. The incapacity of fallen human nature for any good, apart from grace, is declared in the following:

Canon 22. “No one has anything of his own except lying and sin (*nemo habet de suo nisi mendacium et peccatum*). But if man possesses anything of truth or righteousness, it is derived from that fountain for which we ought to thirst in this wilderness, in order that, being as it were sprinkled with some drops from it, we may not faint in the way.”

From this position the absolute necessity of strictly prevenient grace naturally follows:

Canon 3. “If anyone asserts that the grace of God may be conferred in answer to human prayer, and not rather that it is grace itself which causes us to pray for it—he contradicts the

prophet Isaiah, or the Apostle who repeats his words, 'I was found of them that sought me not; I became manifest unto them that asked not of me.'"

Canon 5. "If anyone denies that even the very beginnings of faith and the disposition to believe (whereby we believe in Him who justifies the impious and come unto the regeneration of holy baptism) is bestowed by the gift of grace (that is, by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost correcting our will from infidelity to faith and from impiety to piety) in like manner as the increase of faith is bestowed—and asserts that this beginning of faith is in us by nature—he proves himself an adversary of apostolic doctrine, inasmuch as blessed Paul says 'We are confident that He which began a good work in you will perfect it until the day of Jesus Christ,' and also 'To you it hath been granted in the behalf of Christ, not only to believe on him, but also to suffer in his behalf,' and 'By grace have ye been saved through faith; and that not of yourselves: for it is the gift of God.' For they, who assert that the faith whereby we believe in God is natural to us, in some sense define as 'faithful' all those who are aliens to the Church of Christ."

It will be noticed that in this last sentence the Council assumes, and bases its argument upon, that sharp and rigid distinction between the Church and the world, the former being the home of light, grace and salvation in an exclusive sense, and the latter being given over to sin, darkness and the dominion of the devil, which was a commonplace of African and especially of Augustinian theology—a distinction which is, so to speak, the obverse side of the no less sharp distinction implicit in Augustinian thought between supernatural grace, which is the privilege of the elect, and God's *concursus generalis*, which is all that is enjoyed by the ordinary man. To a modern reader, who is accustomed to the thought that the inspiration of Scripture was conveyed through human channels, and that the Apostle of the Gentiles was endowed with a strongly marked "twice-born" temperament, the Pauline quotations

embodied in these Canons will not, perhaps, appear as conclusive in support of Augustinianism as they seemed to the Council.

The doctrine of Orange is summed up in the concluding statement appended to the Canons:

“This we ought both to preach and to believe—that through the sin of the first man free will was so warped and attenuated, that thenceforward no one can either love God as he ought, or believe in God, or perform any good work for God’s sake, unless the grace of the Divine mercy shall have anticipated him (*nisi eum gratia misericordiæ divinæ præuenerit*). Wherefore also we believe that upon righteous Abel and Noah and Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and upon all the multitude of the ancient Fathers, that illustrious faith, which the Apostle Paul proclaims in their praise,¹ was bestowed, not through a natural good which had previously been granted in Adam, but through the grace of God: which grace we both know and believe to be conferred by the bounty of Christ, after His Incarnation upon all who desire to be baptized, but not to be the product of their free will, according to the teaching of the Apostle Paul” (the usual proof-texts are here repeated).

“This also we believe in accordance with the Catholic faith, that grace having once been received through baptism all the baptized, both can and ought, with the help and co-operation of Christ, fulfil those things which belong to the salvation of their souls, if they are willing to labour faithfully thereat. But that some men are predestined to evil by divine power, not only do we not believe, but also, if there are any who wish to believe so monstrous a doctrine, we anathematise them with all detestation. This also we most healthfully profess and believe, that in every good work it is not the case that we begin and then are afterwards assisted by the mercy of God, but rather that He Himself, no merits of ours preceding His act, first

¹ Heb. xi, attributed to St. Paul.

inspires into us both faith and love of Himself, that we may both faithfully ask for the Sacrament of Baptism and also after Baptism may with His help be able to fulfil those things which are pleasing unto Him. Wherefore we must most evidently believe that the marvellous faith shown by that robber, whom the Lord recalled to the fatherland of Paradise, and by the centurion Cornelius, to whom an angel of the Lord was sent, and by Zacchæus, who was found worthy to receive the Lord into his house, did not arise from nature, but was a gift of the divine bounty." This last sentence is evidently directed against the teaching of Cassian, noticed above.

From the point of view of the Roman Church the doctrine thus set forth is "the Catholic doctrine" of grace, which all subsequent discussion must needs take as its starting point; and even within the English Church it has been traditionally described as such, being treated as authoritative in the present century.¹ In view, however, of the little interest taken by Eastern Christendom in the question, it may be doubted whether the teaching of Orange can really claim the note of œcumenicity from any other than a strictly Roman point of view, though it may well be conceded whatever *auctoritas* or weight belongs to the opinion which has been predominant in Western Christendom. It will be observed that it amounts to a modified, but not fundamentally altered, Augustinianism. It abstains from affirming the irresistibility of grace; it allows man a certain undefined share in the work of his own salvation; and it strongly condemns the idea of a "double predestination" (that is, a predestination of the elect to grace and glory, and of the reprobate to sin and perdition). Augustine had, indeed, not affirmed "reprobation", but only "preterition"—which, as we have pointed out, comes in practice to the same thing. The Council does not mention "preterition"; but seems logically to imply it by its insistence upon the absolute necessity of

¹ Dr. Kidd, *History of the Church*, to A.D. 461, 1922, iii, p. 160.

“prevenient grace”, a grace which since the Incarnation is strictly confined to those whom God wills to become members of the Christian Church (see the conclusion of Canon 5, quoted p. 65), and which is sharply to be distinguished from the “general assistance” which God, as its Creator and sustainer, bestows upon human nature everywhere (compare the Council’s utterances with regard to the faith of the Penitent Thief, Cornelius and Zacchæus). So long as we remain within the bounds of the Augustinian system, the same inexorable difficulty raises its head, no matter how we try to elude it—the difficulty of “reprobation”. If prevenient grace is absolutely necessary for salvation, and if God only wills to bestow it upon a given number of men, it irresistibly follows that He must be deemed to will the non-salvation of those on whom He does not bestow it—just as, if I am in charge of a dozen infants who are utterly dependent upon me for food, and if I deliberately resolve to supply food *only* to five of them, I manifestly resolve thereby to starve the remaining seven. To invoke the inscrutability of God’s counsels and the occult nature of His justice is obviously no answer at all to this difficulty; and I am therefore unable to agree with Dr. Bright that the Council of Orange “earned the respect and gratitude of ages for having brought a great question to a comprehensive settlement”.¹ The “settlement” has, indeed, failed to command universal assent even within the bounds of Western Catholicism, as the sequel of this chapter will show.

The seven hundred years which lie between the Council of Orange and the brilliant efflorescence of scholastic philosophy and theology in the thirteenth century are devoid of interest for the purposes of our inquiry, save in so far as the condemnation of Gottschalk, a monk of Orbais, by the Council of Mainz in A.D. 848, for maintaining the doctrine of a strict “double predestination”, illustrates the fact that the doctrine generally accepted by the Western Church was that of Orange and not of

¹ Op. cit., p. lxvi.

Augustine himself, and in so far as certain *dicta* of Peter Lombard, the so-called "Master of the Sentences" (A.D. 1100-60) constitute a unique signpost (unique, that is, in the history of the technical discussion of this subject) pointing the way to what we shall argue presently to be the true conception of the nature of grace. This author frankly identifies "grace" with the Holy Spirit. This seems to follow from the following utterances: "The Holy Spirit Himself is the love or charity (*caritas*), whereby we love God and our neighbour";¹ "Other acts and motions of virtues are brought about by charity, that is, by the Holy Spirit, through the medium of the virtues whereof they are acts";² "Whence it appears in truth that charity is the Holy Spirit, who informs and sanctifies the qualities of the soul, in order that by them the soul itself may be informed and sanctified";³ and "grace" is defined as being "faith united with charity" (*fides cum caritate*). The impersonal conception of grace, however, which is implicit in Augustinianism, was too strong to be thus set aside, and subsequent writers refrain from following the Lombard's lead on this point.

It is in the thirteenth century, and in the writings of the earlier Franciscan schoolmen, Alexander of Hales (c. A.D. 1170-1245) and Bonaventura (1221-74), that the moral consciousness which asserts man's freedom and responsibility again claims its right to be heard as against the "twice-born" religious consciousness, which affirms his unqualified dependence on God; and that Synergism, which might have been deemed to have been disposed of by the Council of Orange, again makes its appearance. I have elsewhere⁴ pointed out that the theologians of the Franciscan Order inclined, as was fitting in sons of the mild and gentle Saint of Assisi, to a doctrine of the fall and of the resultant state of human nature much milder than that

¹ I *Sent.* dist. 17 B.

² *Ibid.*, dist. 17 Q.

³ II *Sent.* dist. 27 J.

⁴ *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*, p. 409 f.

taught by St. Augustine himself, or by their rivals of the Dominican schools. For them, the malice of Adam's sin was by no means infinite; on the contrary, it was in a sense a very pardonable offence, inasmuch as it sprang from an excessive degree of a certain virtue, namely, love of his neighbour (in this instance, Eve); in fact, many worse sins have been committed by his posterity since. For the earlier Franciscans, Alexander and Bonaventura, the consequences of the Fall involved both an *exspoliatio gratuitorum*, that is, a deprivation of the splendid supernatural gifts of immortality, impassibility, infused knowledge, etc., which were believed to have been bestowed by God upon Adam out of pure bounty, in addition to the ordinary qualities of human nature, and also a *uulneratio naturalium*, that is, an injury or deordination of those ordinary qualities themselves; but in the thought of their greater successor, the "Subtle Doctor", Duns Scotus (c. 1270-1308), the former thought has almost entirely crowded out the latter, and "original sin" becomes no more than a *carentia originalis iustitiæ*, the mere lack of certain magnificent endowments which were no essential part of man's nature, and had only belonged to the remote ancestor of human kind for a very brief space. This minimising view of the Fall and of its consequences naturally involves a correspondingly benevolent attitude towards unregenerate human nature, and makes it easy to admit a freedom of indetermination in the human will which approximates to the unqualified indeterminism of Pelagius himself. Scotus rejects the supposition that the will is in any sense determined by the ends which it pursues or by the intellect; *nihil aliud a uoluntate est causa totalis uolitionis in uoluntate*.¹ Hence, the so-called "Semi-Pelagian" contention, that unregenerate, that is, unconverted, unbaptized and sinful men are capable of initiating in themselves some faint stirrings and strivings towards faith and virtue was bound to reappear; it expresses itself in the celebrated maxim, *si homo facit quod in se est, deus dat ei gratiam*.

¹*Op. Ox.*, ii, 25, q. unica, Nr. 22.

("If man does what is in his own power to do, God grants him grace").¹ This maxim, if it means anything at all, clearly denies the absolute necessity under all circumstances of strictly prevenient grace; but the Franciscans make desperate efforts to disguise the real break with the positions, both of Augustine and of Orange, which this involves. Alexander is at pains to explain that the preliminary exertion of effort, of which he has conceded the possibility, is not to be understood as causing the reception of grace, but only as removing an obstacle to its reception—"as a man by opening a window brings it about that a house is lit up, but does not himself light it up."² It is at this point that the alien conception of "merit" persistently intrudes itself, all through the Scholastic discussion of the subject—a fact which doubtless reflects the influence of that popular medieval conception of religion which roused the ire of the Reformers as seeming to reduce the Christian life to a mere mechanical amassing of merit by means of external works, pilgrimages, fastings, and the like. Doubtless a man cannot cause the bestowal of grace upon himself in a physical sense; but can he cause it morally, by meriting it? To this question both Augustine and the Fathers of Orange had returned an emphatic No; and Alexander renders lip-homage to their authority by affirming—"To do what is in one's own power does not precede grace meritoriously, but (only) dispositively" (*facere quod in se est non præuenit gratiam meritorie, sed dispositiue*).³ But, despite St. Augustine's authority, "merit" refuses to be so easily excluded; a motion of man's free will in the direction of goodness, however feeble, must have *some* merit, however small; hence the act of self-disposition for the reception of grace, whilst not possessing merit in the proper sense of the term, or "*merit de condigno*", is declared to be invested with a certain inferior, and, as it were, metaphorical

¹ Alex. Hal., *Summa*, III, 61, 5, 3.

² *Ibid.*, I, 28, 3, 1.

³ *Summa*, III, 69, 3, 2 and 3.

kind of merit, known as “merit *de congruo*”.¹ This celebrated distinction may be illustrated by the instance of the relations of master and servant. If a servant is hired for a certain wage, and performs his duties satisfactorily, he “merits”, or is entitled to, a certain monthly payment *de condigno*, as a matter of “condignity”, because there is *ex hypothesi* a reasonable proportion between the services rendered and the wages to be paid, and because the master has bound himself by contract to pay this particular sum; but if the master chooses in addition to give him a present at Christmas, in consideration of his zeal and fidelity, he can only be said to merit this *de congruo*, as something which is “congruous” or appropriate to his own good qualities and his master’s benevolence, though not a matter of strict legal obligation. The Franciscan position, then, is that pagans and sinners can in some measure and by the exertion of innate will-power prepare themselves for, and so merit, the bestowal of supernatural grace.

This position is sternly condemned in the thirteenth of the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion (“Of Works before Justification”)—“Works done before the grace of Christ, and the inspiration of His Spirit, are not pleasant to God, forasmuch as they spring not of faith in Jesu Christ, neither do they make men meet to receive grace, or (as the school authors say) deserve grace of congruity (*neque gratiam, ut multi uocant, de congruo merentur*): yea, rather for that they are not done as God hath willed and commanded them to be done we doubt not but they have the nature of sin.” Here the ultra-Augustinian position as to the absolute necessity of prevenient grace and the intrinsically sinful quality of the apparent good works of the heathen is uncompromisingly affirmed; Synergism, indeed, is even more emphatically excluded by the language of Article X (“Of Free Will”)—“The condition of man after the fall of Adam is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural strength and good works to faith and calling upon

¹ Ibid., I. 28, 3, 1.

God." Those who sympathise with the objection felt by the compilers of the Articles to the idea of "congruous merit" are now for the most part led to do so, not so much by theoretical considerations as to the paralysis of the will in fallen human nature and the impossibility of even the faintest motion towards goodness apart from prevenient grace, but rather by the feeling that the whole category of "merit" introduces an unworthily commercial element into the relations of God and the soul; a modern Synergist would probably prefer to think of the beginnings of many conversions under the image of an infant's feeble cry for help and the instantaneous response of a loving Father rather than by means of the slightly sordid conception of work and wages. Meanwhile, it is only necessary to point out that the position taken up by the Articles in regard to "prevenient grace" and "congruous merit" is determined by their scrupulous fidelity to the strictly Augustinian doctrine of the Fall and of original sin; a doctrine which has now ceased to represent the general mind of the English Church, and which owing to the relaxation of the terms of subscription to the Articles in 1865, can no longer be held binding even upon her ministers.

We have suggested that the reappearance of Synergism in the Franciscan schoolmen is to be attributed to the strength of the strictly moral consciousness within them. But they also had a full share of the specifically religious consciousness, which shrinks from attributing anything good to man apart from God, and longs to jettison any apparent merits of its own, even as it longs to abase and almost to annihilate itself before God in the ecstasy of adoration. Moreover, they were in practice bound by the decrees of Orange. Hence, they feel it necessary to ascribe the first Godward stirrings of man's free will, the "doing of what is in one's own power", to a "grace" of some kind, with the result that the absolute necessity of prevenient grace once more returns into the focus of their thought, after having been apparently banished by the aphorism, *si homo facit*

quod in se est, etc. Many are the shifts and subtleties which they employ to reconcile the necessity of prevenient grace with an admission of a real freedom of indetermination in the human will. The chief of these, is, perhaps, the distinction between *gratia gratis data*, which is the preliminary grace disposing the will for the reception of further divine influences (*forma disponens*), and *gratia gratum faciens*, which is "grace" in the full Augustinian sense, carrying out the work of man's perfection (*forma perficiens*). Hence, Bonaventura is able to say: "If a good thought is the first disposition which is necessary for the reception of *gratia gratum faciens*, and a good thought cannot come to be apart from the gift of *gratia gratis data*, it is impossible that free will destitute of all grace should ever dispose itself for receiving *gratia gratum faciens*."¹ This sentence sounds unimpeachably Augustinian; and its Augustinian character is reinforced by the sharp distinction which is elsewhere drawn between *gratia gratis data*, which is super-added to man's natural qualities, and God's *assistentia generalis*, whereby He sustains those qualities in the elect and the non-elect alike. So Bonaventura says: "We call by the name of *gratia gratis data* whatever that may be which is superadded to man's natural qualities, in some way assisting and preparing the will for the habit or the use of grace, whether this gratuitous gift be itself a habit, such as servile fear or the piety which in the case of some men has been instilled into their heart from childhood, or whether it be an act of some kind such as some calling or locution, whereby God stirs up man's soul to seek after Himself."² But occasionally *gratia gratis data* simply merges into the *assistentia generalis*, as is shown by the following passage from Alexander: "In like manner there exists in infidels right reason itself, which I call *gratia gratis data* or 'disposing grace'; for, although it is naturally innate in them, nevertheless it is God's gratuitous gift, and also the fact that it moves them to-

¹ *Sent.* ii, 28, 2, 1 c. (Quaracchi, II, 682 b).

² *Sent.* ii, 28, 2, 1 (Quar., II, 682 a b).

wards good is given gratuitously by God.”¹ A similar implication appears to be contained in the *dictum* of Bonaventura; “Scarcely ever, or never, is anyone found possessing the use of free will, but devoid of *gratia gratis data*.”² But, if *gratia gratis data* is merely another name for free will or for the natural goods of man’s mental and physical constitution, the element of prevenient grace or of catastrophic divine action from outside can only be found in the “special providences” which bring this or that individual within reach of moralising or ennobling influences; and the unequal distribution of such special providences still leaves us with the problem of “reprobation” (with reference to those to whom such special providences are not vouchsafed) in all its formidable inexplicability.

It is not an unfair conclusion that the Franciscan theologians were really trying to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, and that in their heart of hearts they accepted the fundamental premises of Cassian’s position—namely, the survival of real free will (in the ordinary sense of the term) in fallen man, and his consequent possession of the power to respond or not to respond to divine influences, even at the very outset of his moral and religious life. From these two positions the third belief characteristic of Synergism follows irresistibly—the belief in predestination *post præuisa merita*; and so we find it taught by the Franciscan schoolmen. As explained before, “predestination” so interpreted does not really amount to more than “prevision”; but Alexander of Hales contrives to bring it within the framework of Augustinian terminology by distinguishing between the *causa*, or “efficient cause,” and the *ratio*, or “ground” of man’s election. So he is able to say: “The *cause* of election is on the side of God and not on ours (*ex parte dei, non ex parte nostra*)”—which has a thoroughly Augustinian sound; he continues, however, “but the *ground* of election may be on the side of man, in accordance

¹ *Summa*, iii, 70, 3.

² *Sent.* ii, 28, 2, 1 (Quar., II., 682 b).

with the co-operation of his free will.”¹ This, of course, assumes that God can foresee what is strictly contingent, i.e., what is not yet decided, a power which Origen had denied to Him; and it is no doubt possible to raise many metaphysical puzzles as to how God can have knowledge of that which strictly speaking does not exist, as the contingent results of an absolutely undetermined, and therefore unpredictable, choice do not exist. Scotus escapes from this difficulty by invoking the conception of the timelessness of God. Exempt, in virtue of His infinity, from imprisonment in the time-process, He views in one eternal intuition the whole procession of temporal and contingent events spread out before Him like a map. Hence, “Words implying diverse times, when spoken of God . . . can more properly be said to signify the Now of eternity (*nunc æternitatis*) rather than real temporal differences.”² It follows that the divine predestination was not a single act carried out once and for all at some infinitely remote point of time before the world was; it is rather an act which God may be said to be performing every day (inasmuch as, owing to His timelessness, He is the contemporary of all ages and generations), in accordance with the actual results of man’s free choice. “It is the same thing, when we say that God is predestining, has predestined and will predestine” (*idem est deum prædestinare et prædestinasse et prædestinaturum esse*).³ The idea of “reprobation” is thus stripped of its immoral and tyrannical implications: “Seeing that reprobation means the will to condemn, reprobation will have on the part of its object a certain ground (*ratio*), namely, a foreseen final sin.”⁴ We seem thus to have arrived at an almost Pelagian indeterminism; but the necessity of preserving at least a verbal loyalty to Augustine compels Scotus to affirm, a little later,

¹ *Summa*, i, 30, 5.

² *Op. Ox.* i, 9, q. unica, Nr. 6.

³ *Ibid.*, i, 40, q. unica, Nr. 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, i, 41, q. unica, Nr. 11.

that the reprobate person remains in sin because God has not willed to give him grace.¹ This final inconsistency will not be a matter of surprise to those who remember the conditions under which the Franciscan theologians worked.

The three points of Synergism, which represent its capital divergences from the Augustinian system—namely, the survival of real free will in fallen man, the non-necessity under all circumstances of strictly prevenient grace, and the doctrine of predestination *post præuisa merita*—thus stand out with clearness, beneath their veil of Augustinian terminology, in the writings of the Franciscan divines. Despite the opposition of the theologians belonging to the great rival Order of St. Dominic, who followed the lead of their illustrious Doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas,² in maintaining a strict and even intensified Augustinianism, and of such predestinarian stalwarts amongst the secular clergy as Thomas of Bradwardine (d. 1349) and Wycliffe (d. 1384), the milder doctrine of grace continued to gain ground in the theological schools of Europe all through the Middle Ages; on the eve of the Reformation Gabriel Biel, sometimes known as “the last of the schoolmen”, defended without challenge the theory of “congruous merit”,³ which, as we have pointed out, contains by implication the whole of Synergism. The history of the Augustinian reaction witnessed by the age of the Reformation, and the attempts which were made during its course to discover a solution of the intractable problem of grace and free will, will claim our attention in the next two chapters.

¹ *Op. Ox.* i, 41, q. unica, Nr. 12 and 13.

² See Additional Note, “Grace in St. Thomas Aquinas”, p. 78.

³ *In Sent.* II, q. xxvii. Biel died in 1495, and was the first professor of theology in the University of Tübingen.

ADDITIONAL NOTE

“GRACE” IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

THE doctrine of grace taught by St. Thomas Aquinas is described by Loofs as “ein deterministisch verschärfter Augustinismus”—“a deterministically sharpened Augustinianism.”¹ His conception of grace is metaphysically based upon the Aristotelian idea of God as the Unmoved Prime Mover (πρῶτον κινεῖν ἀκίνητον), an idea which inevitably generates belief, not merely in the universal necessity of grace, but in its strict irresistibility. “If it is in accordance with the intention of God the Mover that the man, whose heart He moves, shall acquire grace, then that man infallibly does acquire grace.”² He strongly repudiates predestination “in view of foreseen merit”,³ and strongly affirms the universal and absolute necessity of prevenient grace.⁴ His treatment, however, of the maxim, “If man does what is in his own power to do, God grants him grace”,⁵ with its *prima facie* Synergistic implications, is interesting, as suggesting a certain tendency to modify the strict Augustinian view which held not merely that man is incapable of any motion towards goodness apart from prevenient grace, but also that prevenient grace is only bestowed upon those who are, or are predestined to become, members of the Christian Church. In one passage of the *Summa Theologica*,⁶

¹ *Leitfaden*, p. 551.

² *Summa theol.* Ia iiæ, q. 112, art. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, i, q. 23, art. 5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Ia iiæ, q. cix, art. 6.

⁵ An alternative form of the maxim is *facienti quod in se est deus non denegat gratiam*.

⁶ Ia iiæ, q. cix, art. 6, 2.

his imaginary opponent quotes the phrase as showing "that man can prepare himself for grace through his own powers without the exterior help of grace"; St. Thomas in his reply does not dispute the truth of the maxim, but explains it on Augustinian lines as meaning that man can only so prepare himself through the gratuitous help of God moving him interiorly. In other places, however, he seems to approximate to a less stringent view, as in the following:¹ "If any of them" (that is, of the Jews who refused to believe in Christ) "had done 'what was in their own power',² the Lord in accordance with His mercy would have provided for them by sending them a preacher of the faith, as He sent Peter to Cornelius." And a quotation from his Commentary on the *Sentences* seems to indicate a high-water mark of his approximation to the characteristically Franciscan view: "To the fourth contention we reply that a man can prepare himself even for the possession of faith through the powers which belong to natural reason; for which reason it is said that if a man born amongst barbarous nations does 'what is in his own power', God will reveal to him that which is necessary for salvation, either by secret inspiration or by the sending of a teacher."³ As, however, his commentary on the work of the Lombard belongs to his earliest period, it may be supposed that this apparent concession to human nature is one which his maturity was not prepared wholeheartedly to endorse.

His views with regard to predestination may best be illustrated by a quotation: "To the third objection (*viz.* that the hypothesis of an absolute 'double predestination' entirely independent of the merits or demerits of individuals imputes tyrannical injustice to God) 'we must reply, that the ground (*ratio*) of the predestination of some and the reprobation of others can be deduced from the Divine goodness itself. For,

¹ *In Rom.*, on x, 18.

² *Si . . . fecissent quod in se est*: the technically incorrect sequence of *est* indicates that the phrase *quod in se est* is meant as a quotation.

³ *Sent.* II, xxviii, 1, 4 ad 4.

God is said to have created all things because of His goodness in the sense that He created them in order that His goodness might be displayed in the created universe. Now it is necessary that the Divine goodness, which in itself is one and simple, should be displayed in the universe under many forms, inasmuch as created things cannot attain to the simplicity of the Divine nature. Hence it follows that for the perfection of the universe there are required different gradations of things, whereof some hold a lofty place and some the lowest place in the whole scheme. And in order that a multiformity of gradations may be preserved in things, God permits some evils to happen, lest many goods should be hindered, as we have said above, q. xxii, art. 2, and as may be gathered from Augustine, *ad Simpl.*, q. II, and *de bono persever.* ii, 8. Let us therefore consider the whole human race as being analogous to the whole universe of things. God has willed to display His goodness amongst men; in the case of the elect, He displays it under the mode of mercy, by sparing them—in the case of the reprobate, under the mode of justice, by punishing them. And this is the ground for God's election of some and reprobation of others. This is designated as the cause (of predestination) by the Apostle in Rom. ix, 22, where he says 'God, willing to shew His wrath' that is, the vengeance dictated by His righteousness, 'and to make His power known, endured', that this, permitted, 'with much long-suffering vessels of wrath fitted unto destruction, that He might make known the riches of His glory upon vessels of mercy, which He afore prepared unto glory'; and in 2 Timothy ii, 20, 'In a great house there are not only vessels of gold and of silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some unto honour, and some unto dishonour.' But for the fact that God has elected *these particular individuals* to glory, and has reprobated *those*, no ground can be assigned except the Divine Will. Wherefore Augustine says, in *Ioann.* xxvi" (on John vi, 44, "No man can come to me, except the Father which sent me draw him"): "Why He draws this man and does not draw that,

attempt not to decide, if thou dost not wish to err.' In like manner when we consider the material universe, we can assign a ground for the fact that, despite the fundamental homogeneity of the basic matter (*prima materia*), part of it was created by God in the beginning under the form of fire, and part under the form of earth — namely, the desirability of the existence of a diversity of species in natural things; but the reason why this particular part of matter should exist under this form, and that part under that, depends upon the simple Divine Will; just as the fact that *this* stone is embedded in this part of the wall, and another in that, depends on the simple will of the mason, although the architectural plan may demand that there should be *some* stones in one part, and *some* in the other."¹ It will be obvious from this quotation that St. Thomas merely crosses St. Augustine's t's and dots his i's, and in particular that he assumes the sufficiency of "original guilt" as a ground for the damnation of the reprobate, quite apart from their own personal merits or demerits.

The only original contribution made by St. Thomas to the development of the concept of grace consists in his analysis of its essence—which is an attempt, such as we do not find in many other classical theologians, Fathers or schoolmen, frankly to face the problem, What, after all, is "grace"?² To the question "whether grace places anything in the soul" it is replied that "when man is said to have the grace of God, there is signified a supernatural something (*quiddam supernaturale*) in man coming forth from God."³ The use of the neuter gender vividly illustrates the *impersonality* which we have seen clinging to the ecclesiastical conception of grace from the days of Tertullian downwards. We naturally ask, Under what category is this "supernatural something" to be conceived—as a hypostasis, a quality, or a movement? St. Thomas replies

¹ *Summa*, i, q. 23, art. 5.

² For this, see *ibid.*, ia iiæ q. cx.

³ Art. i.

by introducing yet another distinction into the discussion of grace; to the distinctions already noticed, that between "prevenient" and "subsequent" (or "operant" and "co-operant") and that between "sufficient" and "efficacious", he adds the further and no less celebrated distinction between "actual" and "habitual" grace. This is expressed in the following words: "Man is assisted by the bountiful will of God in two ways. The *first* way is that whereby the soul of man is moved by God to know, will or do something; and in this way the effect of grace in man is not a quality, but a certain motion (*motus quidam*) of the soul; for 'the act of a mover in that which is moved is motion,' as is said in the third book of (Aristotle's) Physics, text. 18. The *second* way which man is assisted by the bountiful will of God consists in the infusion by God of a certain habitual gift (*aliquod habituale donum*) into the soul. This is given because it would not be fitting that God should have less care for those whom He loves in order that they may possess supernatural good, than for the natural creatures which He loves in order that they may possess natural good. Now for the natural creatures He provides in such a way, that He not only moves them to natural acts, but also bestows upon them certain forms and powers which are the first principles of acts, in order that of themselves they may be inclined to motions of this kind; and so the motions to which they are moved by God become connatural and easy to the creatures. . . . Much more, therefore, is it the case that into the souls of those whom He moves towards acquiring the supernatural and eternal good, God infuses certain forms, or supernatural qualities, so that in accordance with these they may be delightfully and promptly moved by Him to obtain the eternal good; and so the gift of grace, understood in this sense, is a certain quality."¹

We thus arrive at the conception of two kinds of grace—(a) a permanent, or relatively permanent (for it may be destroyed by

¹ *Summa theol.* ia iiæ q. cx, art. 2.

mortal sin), habit inhering in the soul ("habitual grace"), imparted in justification—and (b) a series of transient effluxes of divine power impinging upon the human will in order to incline it to particular good acts ("actual graces," so called not to distinguish them from any sort of potential or imaginary graces, but merely because each of them is, so to speak, designed *ad hoc*, with the object of producing some one good action). Considered as a "form", "habitual grace" is said to inhere *accidentally* (that is, as a "separable accident") in the soul, though it inheres *substantially* in God Himself;¹ in this way the idea of the "deification" of the soul through participation in the Divine nature, which is common in the Greek Fathers, and which runs back to 2 Peter i, 4 ("that . . . ye may become partakers of the divine nature"), is clothed in the categories of Aristotelian logic. It might be thought that "habitual grace" is to be identified with the Christian character, or the total complex of all Christian virtues; but St. Thomas explains that, being, or being grounded on, "participation in the divine nature", it is something deeper and more mysterious than any or all of the virtues; it is a kind of unknown *x* which is the hidden source of them all.² The virtues may be habits of the various faculties of the soul, but the mysterious quality known as "habitual grace" inheres in its essence. The secret control exercised over the faculties by this almost indefinable "quality" is of such a kind that it may be compared to the control of a rider over his horse.³ It is to be noted that in the light of this distinction, the two older distinctions, between "prevenient" and "subsequent", and between "sufficient" and "efficacious grace", henceforward only apply to the series of "actual graces".

¹ *Summa theol.* ia iiæ q. cx, art. 2, ad 2.

² *Ibid.*, art. 3.

³ *Summa theol.* ia iiæ q. cxi, art. 4, ad 1: "secundum hoc gratia comparatur ad uoluntatem ut mouens ad motum, quæ est comparatio sessoris ad equum."

SYNERGISM IN THE CHURCHES OF THE REFORMATION

IT is usual to think of the Reformation as the result of the following factors: *first*, the disgust felt by good men at the moral corruptions of the hierarchy, and the consequent demand for a purification of the Church in head and members; *secondly*, the influences of the New Learning and of the study of the New Testament in Greek, which seemed to disclose a complete unlikeness between the elaborate fabric of Western Catholicism and the simplicity of the primitive Gospel; and, *thirdly*, the revolt of the awakening self-consciousness of the northern nations against the domination of a priestly imperialism seated south of the Alps. No doubt the motives here indicated all played their part in producing the great cataclysm; but it is vital to the understanding of the Reformation to remember that it had yet a fourth, and, from the standpoint of religious psychology, even more important aspect—it was a great uprising of the “twice-born” genius and temperament against a religious system which had, consciously or unconsciously, become adapted in the main to the spiritual needs of the “once-born” man, and indeed of the “once-born” man in his least aspiring and most easy-going mood. It is in this way that we are to understand the vehemence of the Reformers’ attack upon the Mass, pilgrimages, indulgences, the Rosary, feast and fast-days, and other external observances which, they thought, encouraged the natural man to believe that he could acquire a purely mechanical holiness without any inward change of heart and whilst still on good terms with the world.

The "twice-born" man is naturally inclined to be impatient with his "once-born" brother; he cannot understand how anyone can claim to be religious who has not shared his own compelling experience of direct mystical union with God in Christ and of instantaneous, or all but instantaneous, moral transformation, and he insists upon regarding this experience as normal. As we have seen, the "twice-born" experience, when translated into intellectual terms, inevitably expresses itself as Augustinianism; and hence the Reformation was, on its theological side, a colossal recrudescence of Augustinianism in opposition to the so-called "semi-Pelagianism" which, under Franciscan and Nominalist influence, had become dominant in the schools of the later Middle Ages. The secret workings of this factor in the complex of causes which produced the Reformation are, almost unconsciously, betrayed by Luther when he designates, as the three books or collections of books which had most powerfully moulded his own spirit, the Bible, the *Theologia Germanica*, and the writings of St. Augustine.

As we have seen in the case of St. Thomas, the tendency of subsequent interpreters of St. Augustine has been to draw out, emphasise and underline points in his system which are, indeed, logically implicit in it, but which he himself does not always clearly express. Luther's republication of Augustinianism begins by sharpening its initial premise, the doctrine of the corruption of human nature through the Fall, to a point at which it becomes what is popularly known as the doctrine of the "total depravity" of human nature. Typical expressions of this doctrine are the following: "It is the essence of man to sin," "original sin is that very thing which is born of a father and a mother," "Man, as he is born of father and mother, is with his whole nature and essence not merely a sinner but sin itself."¹ It follows from this that fallen man has no real freedom of choice at all; he invariably and necessarily wills what is evil, and Augustine's laborious attempts to show that the will is still

¹ Quoted in *The Ideas of the Fall*, etc., p. 429.

free, even though it may be invariably determined by concupiscence, are frankly given up. This position is strikingly proclaimed in the title of Luther's work against Erasmus—*de seruo arbitrio*, "On the Slave Will", a phrase which, as he elsewhere acknowledges, he had borrowed from his master. "'Free will' constituted apart from grace possesses absolutely no power for righteousness, but necessarily continues in sin, wherefore the blessed Augustine, in his book against Julian, rightly calls it the slave rather than the free will."¹ The moral impotence of unregenerate man is even more picturesquely expressed in the celebrated dictum: "In spiritual and divine matters which pertain to the salvation of the soul man is like the statue of salt into which the wife of the patriarch Lot was turned, nay rather he is like to a log, a stone, a statue lacking life, which has the use neither of eyes nor of mouth nor of any other senses nor yet of heart."²

From this unqualified determinism it naturally follows that the work of salvation is exclusively God's throughout, and not even a crevice is left for the play of man's co-operation. "We can only become subjects of God's works and counsels, when our own counsels cease and our works are laid to rest and we are made purely passive (*pure passivi*) in respect of God both as regards interior and exterior actions."³ Synergism is thus decisively ruled out, and what we may call (employing a convenient German term) a *monergistic* view of grace is substituted. The maxim "*facienti quod in se est*", which he had himself quoted in his commentary on the Psalms, was denounced as "a most absurd opinion and one which vehemently upholds the Pelagian error".⁴ The inevitable corollary of such a position is the doctrine of absolute "double predestination" *ante merita*, though Luther's predominantly practical and ethical

¹ Quoted by Denifle, *Luther und Luthertum*, I, 486 n. 2; the passage in St. Augustine is *c. Iul. Pel.* ii, 8, 23.

² In *Genes.* c, xix.

³ Denifle, I, 599, n. 3.

⁴ Denifle, I, 553, n. 4.

interests, no less than his lack of speculative power, appear to have prevented him from expressing this idea with clearness.

It is to be noted that the emphasis laid by the Reformation upon Holy Scripture as the sole fount of all religious truth had, as might be expected, the effect of initiating a certain revival of the strictly Pauline use of the term "grace", as meaning not power but kindness—not a motion communicated by God to the soul or a habit infused by Him into it, but the benevolent disposition with which He regards His elect. If the term be used strictly in this sense it follows that the result of grace is not so much moral transformation as the forgiveness of sins; and it is common for modern historians of dogma in Protestant Germany to single this point out as one of the cardinal contributions which the Reformers made to the restoration of true religion, though in countries where Luther does not hold the position of a national hero, and where, consequently, it is possible to examine his teachings in a spirit of critical impartiality without incurring the reproach of lack of patriotism, it may be more natural to hold that the question is merely one of terminology. Obviously God both regards the elect with favour, and exerts His power in order to sanctify them; so long as it is recognised that the favour and the power are both facts, it does not seem to matter very much in the nature of things whether the word "grace" be used to denote the former or the latter fact—though it is arguable (and we shall, later, argue) that the ecclesiastical significance of "grace" as power has been so deeply stereotyped by the usage of centuries that the attempt to revive, in ordinary speech the strictly Pauline significance of the term is a piece of needless pedantry.¹ It may be observed that the Reformers themselves were not able to employ this usage with consistency, and that they could

¹ *Gratia* is defined as *fauor gratuitus* in the following passages: Melancthon, *Didymi Faudentini adu. Thom. Plac. orat. pro M. Luthero*, *Corpus Reformatorum*, I, 311: and *Loci*, 1521, C. R. XXI, 158: Calvin—*Inst.* II, 17, 1, 2, 5.

not prevent themselves from slipping back into the conception of grace as power, a fact of which the doctrine of "irresistible grace" is the clearest testimony. A similar and more permanently valuable restoration of the Pauline vocabulary is to be found in the revival of the forensic signification of "justification", as meaning the judicial non-imputation of sins; though it may be doubted whether the hypothesis built by Luther and his followers upon the word, that of an arbitrary imputation of Christ's merits to the elect, was not intrinsically liable to be abused, as in fact it was abused, by Antinomianism. It must, however, be counted to the credit of the Reformers that they connected the idea of God's healing power with the idea of the Holy Spirit much more closely than had been done since the days of the Primitive Church; though, like many of the Fathers, they do not appear to be able to make up their minds whether "grace" is the Holy Spirit or a "gift" bestowed by the Holy Spirit. We may further draw attention to the quasi-sacramental character attributed by the Reformers to preaching as a "means of grace"; an energetic expression of this point of view is found in Luther's declaration— "Uerbum, inquam, et solum uerbum est uehiculum gratiæ"—"The Word, I say, and only the Word is the vehicle of grace."¹

Luther's gentler and more refined friend and fellow-Reformer, Philip Melanchthon, had at first followed his lead in adopting an ultra-Augustinian and predestinarian doctrine of grace. "If you consider the human will in the light of predestination, there is no liberty at all either in outward or in

¹ *Commentary on Galatians*, 1519 (Weimar edition of Luther's Works, II, 509). John Knox appears to have held that sacraments administered without the accompaniment of preaching were invalid; cf. his letter to Mrs. Anna Lock, 6 April, 1559—"Without the soule I say (your sacraments) wer ministred, becaus they wer ministred without the Word trulie and openlie preached" (B. J. Kidd, *Documents of the Continental Reformation*, No. 339). Something of the same feeling may have induced the compilers of the Prayer Book to intersperse the administration of the Sacraments with "Exhortations", long and short.

inward deeds, but all things come to pass according to the divine ordinance.”¹ He even goes so far as to assert, in the edition of his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, published in the year 1525: “Not merely does God permit His creatures to act, but He Himself is the proper agent in all things that happen; so that as men confess that the conversion of Paul was God’s proper work, so they ought to confess both that morally indifferent actions, such as when men eat, are God’s works, and also actions which are bad, like David’s adultery: for it is certain that God does all things not permissively but by His power, so that the treason of Judas was no less His proper work than the conversion of Paul.” This audacious utterance was withdrawn from later editions of the commentary; and from 1527 onwards his thought begins to move away from the extreme predestinarianism into which he had allowed himself to be carried. In his *scholia* on the Epistle to the Colossians he admits that man as such possesses reason and the power of choice, and therefore God’s action on him must be different from His action on inanimate creatures; he even concedes to unregenerate man the possibility of “carnal and civil righteousness”, that is, of ordinary morality as distinct from supernaturally inspired good works, thereby abandoning the strict Augustinian position that the apparent good works of the heathen are really sins. In the edition of the commentary on Romans, published in 1552, he recognises that 1 Timothy ii, 4, “God willeth that all men should be saved”, must be taken in its natural sense; and he takes the momentous step of affirming that “the mercy of God is truly the cause of election, but nevertheless there is a certain cause of election in the elected person, in so far as he does not reject God’s promise offered to him; for evil arises solely from ourselves”. This sentence, admitting as it does, a certain power in man to accept or reject divine grace, in effect concedes the principle of what we have anticipatorily called “Synergism”, a name which was invented

¹ *Loci*, 1521, CR XXI, 93.

to describe Melanchthon's views by his opponents in the long controversy which now began to rage within the bosom of Lutheranism, and only ended, in so far as it did end, with the publication of the *Formula of Concord* in 1577.

This change of front on the part of Melanchthon would seem to have been due to two factors—the first, the desire to understand conversion on its human side, as a psychological process, and secondly, by the practical and pastoral necessities which demand some sort of free will in man as the logical presupposition of moral exhortation. St. Paul, read in the light of St. Augustine, forbade him to attribute to the will the power of originating anything good; but the needed measure of freedom was found in the supposition that it has the power to refrain from resisting the work of the Holy Spirit. Hence there are three “concurrent causes of good action”—“the Word, the Holy Spirit and the will, not by any means as an inert factor but as fighting against its own weakness”;¹ and he quotes with approval Chrysostom's comment on St. John vi, 44, “No man can come to me, except the Father which sent me draw him”—“Now He that draws draws him who wishes to be drawn” (ὁ δὲ ἔγκων τὸν βουλόμενον ἔλκει).² It is not surprising to discover a hesitating re-emergence of the last of the cardinal points of Synergism, namely, the conception of predestination *post praeiūsa merita*: “there must needs be in us some cause of the distinction” (*necesse est in nobis esse aliquam discriminis causam*) whereby God rejects some and elects others.

The chief figures in the Synergistic controversy, of which the details may be studied in the ordinary text-books of the history of dogma, were Matthias Flacius, the advocate of ultra-Augustinianism, and Victorinus Strigel, a follower of Melanchthon. The psychological basis of the divergence between the severer and the milder doctrines of grace is vividly shown by the differing views of conversion held by these two divines.

¹ *Loci*, 1535, CR XXI, 376.

² *Loci*, 1559, CR XXI, 658.

Strigel, a theologian of "once-born" temperament, thinks of conversion as a gradual and equable process extending over the whole life; Flacius regards it as consummated in a second, by a catastrophic exercise of God's sovereign power, and would doubtless have accepted the famous distich:

"Between the stirrup and the ground
Mercy I sought, mercy I found",

as an apt illustration of its nature. We have already pointed out that men's conclusions in these matters are apt to be determined by their temperaments, and that the doctrinal schemes which they construct are, in the language of modern psychology, "rationalizations", intellectual façades concealing one or other of the two great types of emotional religious experience. In so far as these experiences can be crystallised into judgements at all, the fundamental judgement is that of the religious thinker upon himself and his own nature, a judgement which takes the form of an anthropology or doctrine of man; and it is, therefore, its anthropology which determines, both logically and psychologically, the character of any given scheme of soteriology. Strigel, like all other synergists, maintains that man's free will and capacity for goodness was not obliterated by the Fall, but merely hampered and constricted in their activity. He uses the curious simile of a magnet, which when smeared with onion-juice, is unable to exert its powers of attraction, but nevertheless retains those powers in temporary abeyance. From this point of view, the work of grace consists rather in liberating the old will from adventitious hindrances, than in creating a new one; and the phrases "new birth" and "new creation" must not be understood in too stringently literal a sense. Hence conversion is not a mere catastrophic act of God impinging upon the soul *ab extra*, but presupposes the co-operation of man's own intellect and will. Against Flacius he contends, "The Word of God does not possess a magical efficacy (*uim magicam*); but the regeneration and recreation of man take place not without his own reflection upon

the Word and not without some movement of his will." It is interesting to note that the reproach of "magic", as brought against systems implying the objectivity of grace, is as old as the sixteenth century, and was first raised against an unimpeachably Protestant theologian in an entirely non-sacramental context. Strigel, however, is anxious not to exaggerate the amount of man's share in the work of his own salvation, and uses the quaint comparison "it is as if I sat at a banquet where each guest contributes to the total cost, by the side of a rich man, and he paid a thaler and I a heller".¹

Flacius's reply to these contentions was not lacking in vigour. "One egg is not liker another than his Synergy is to the Pelagian," he angrily commented; and Nicholas Amsdorf added, "Man, they (i.e. the Synergists) say, can by the natural powers of his free will equip and prepare himself for the reception of God's grace—exactly the teaching of the godless sophists, Thomas of Aquino, Scotus, and their disciples."² And Flacius adopts and develops with enthusiasm Luther's *dictum* about the likeness of unregenerate man to a log or stone: "But if it is appropriate at all to compare the old man with a log, it may most rightly be said, that just as a log or a stone adopts a merely passive attitude towards the sculptor or the carver, so also in conversion and regeneration man's attitude towards God is purely passive, seeing that man is being made by God into a new creature": indeed, fallen man is worse than a log, for his attitude towards God's operation on him is not merely passive but actively recalcitrant—he is like a piece of gnarled and knotted wood which is quite unfitted for the wood-carver's art.³ As, nevertheless, the divine Carver does in fact succeed in fashioning a certain number of images of Himself (that is, the elect) out of this unpromising material, we must

¹ *Disp. inter Flacium et Strigelium*, p. 104.

² *Öffentliche Bekenntnis der reinen Lehre des Evangelii*, etc., Jena, 1558.

³ *Disp. inter Flacium et Strigelium*, p. 382.

suppose that His grace is in these instances strictly irresistible.

It was, perhaps, to be expected that the Formula of Concord, which is now one of the authoritative standards of the Lutheran Church, should have ended the controversy with a somewhat inconsistent compromise. The first Article of this document, "concerning original sin", explicitly rejects Strigel's simile of the magnet and the onion-juice, without, however, mentioning the name of its author; and affirms that "original sin is no trivial corruption, but is so profound a corruption of human nature as to leave nothing sound, nothing uncorrupt in the body or soul of man, or in his mental or bodily powers".¹ It rejects, however, at the same time, and brands with the note of Manicheism, Flacius's opinion (which only repeated some of Luther's more extreme utterances) that "original sin is properly, and without any distinction, the very substance, nature, and essence of fallen man, so that between his corrupt nature after the Fall, considered in itself, and original sin there is no difference at all".² (But the Formula endeavours, somewhat unconvincingly, to exempt Luther's own utterances from this condemnation.)³ Nevertheless, original sin is quite grave enough to destroy free will in fallen man: "by how much it is impossible that a dead body should vivify itself and restore corporal life to itself, even so impossible is it that man, who by reason of sin is spiritually dead, should have any faculty of recalling himself into spiritual life".⁴ The text, "Without me ye can do nothing" is interpreted as meaning that "In these few words Christ denies to free will all power whatever, and ascribes all to divine grace."⁵ The position of Flacius is approved, that man in respect of his capacity for conversion is worse than a log, for he is a rebel against and an enemy of the

¹ Formula of Concord, i (Schaff, *Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant Churches*, 1877, pp. 100, 102).

² Formula of Concord, i (Schaff, p. 103.)

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., ii (p. 108).

⁵ Ibid., p. 109.

divine will. Consequently, man's salvation is from first to last the work of the Holy Spirit (it is noticeable that the term "grace" is very sparingly used). Synergism is emphatically and explicitly condemned: "We repudiate and condemn . . . the teaching that, although unregenerate man, in respect of free will, is indeed (antecedently to his regeneration) too infirm to make a beginning of his own conversion, and by his own powers to convert himself to God, and obey the law of God with all his heart; yet if the Holy Spirit, by the preaching of the Word, shall have made a beginning, and offered His grace in the Word to man, then that man, by his own natural and proper powers, can, as it were, give some assistance and co-operation (though it be but slight, infirm and languid) towards his conversion, and can apply and prepare himself unto grace, apprehend it, embrace it, and believe the Gospel."¹ Melancthon's three concurrent causes of conversion are thus reduced to one alone, namely, the Holy Spirit, the Word being merely the Spirit's instrument and the assent of man's will merely the effect of His operation.

This doctrine had certain undesirable consequences, of which the worst may be described in the words of the Formula itself. "We are not ignorant that this pious doctrine concerning the impotence and malice of natural free will . . . is impiously, shamefully and malignantly abused by sundry enthusiasts and Epicureans. For many impious wretches, depraved by their speeches, become dissolute and fierce, practise with negligence or even abandon altogether all exercises of piety, such as prayer, devout reading and meditation; and openly profess 'that, inasmuch as they cannot by their own strength convert themselves to God, they will persevere in their rebellion against Him, or will wait until they are converted by Him violently and against their own wills'."² It cannot be denied that predestinarianism, although it has produced a certain noble and

¹ Formula of Concord, ii (Schaff, pp. 110, 111.)

² *Solid. declar.* ii (de lib. arbitr., § 46).

austere type of Christian character, has also generated much antinomianism as a by-product. The second consequence is perhaps of less intrinsic importance, though it was not less embarrassing to the divines of the sixteenth century. It was apparently not uncommon for those who desired to avoid church-going to argue as follows: "Unregenerate man has no free will, and cannot perform any good work until moved and assisted thereto by grace; now to attend church and to listen to sermons is a good work; but I am unregenerate, and have not yet been moved by grace to attend church; I need not, therefore, precisely because I cannot without a grace which I have not yet received, make any efforts to go to church, and can therefore stay away with at least as clear a conscience as I have at present." To this the Formula can only reply by affirming that fallen man still possesses a certain "locomotive power" (*locomotiva potentia*), or power of controlling his bodily limbs,¹ and therefore that he can at least walk to the church building and sit through the sermon²—apparently ignoring the fact that, on its own principles, no one could resolve to do even this except as the result of the previous inspiration of grace.

In concluding this brief survey of the solution offered by the Formula of Concord, we may note this document's assumption that *fear* plays a necessary part in the process of the sinner's conversion. "The knowledge of sins cometh of the law. Now for salutary conversion that penitence, which consists merely in contrition, is not sufficient: it is necessary that there should be added thereto faith in Christ, whose merit is offered, through the sweet and consoling preaching of the Gospel, to all sinners now returning to their senses, who have been overwhelmed with terror (*perterriti et prostrati*) by the teaching of the law. For the Gospel announces the remission of sins not to minds that are at ease, but to those that are deeply troubled and sincerely penitent. And lest such contrition and the terrors of the law should

¹ *Solid. declar.* ii (de lib. arbitr. 24).

² *Ibid.*, 53.

convert themselves into despair, there is need of the preaching of the Gospel that there may be repentance unto salvation.”¹ No doubt this description admirably fits the “twice-born” type of conversion, as autobiographically depicted by Bunyan in “Grace abounding to the Chief of Sinners”; but it has little relation to the more equable and healthful growth in goodness of the “once-born” Christian, and merely illustrates that vehement, impatient tendency of the “twice-born” saint, on which we have already commented, to impose his own experience as normal upon all other men, or at any rate only to count as Christians those who have shared it.

Synergism thus seemed to have been disposed of within the Churches belonging to the Lutheran wing of the Reformation; and it is, perhaps, one of the ironies of history that it should have burst out with renewed vigour within the “Reformed” or Calvinistic communion, which, as the latter of these names implies, held the doctrines of Augustine in that completely rounded and remorselessly logical form which had been imposed upon them by the genius of John Calvin, the religious dictator of Geneva. In Calvinism, the Augustinian system had been elaborated as a series of corollaries from one fundamental principle—that of the absolute, universal, overwhelming sovereignty of God. From this follow, by inevitable steps, the infinite guilt of the Fall, the total depravity of fallen human nature, the absoluteness of God’s pre-mundane decree to save certain individuals and its complete independence of their foreseen merits or demerits. This conception of God’s absoluteness seemed, further, to involve the irresistibility of grace—for, it was urged, it would be derogatory to the dignity of the Almighty to suppose that He would subject Himself to the possibility of defeat, as would be the case if grace could be resisted and, if by consequence, all the “elect” chose to resist it and so to forfeit salvation; it also necessitated the doctrine of “particular redemption”, that is, the belief that the Atone-

¹ *Solid. declar.* v, de lege at ev. 8.

ment was not meant for all mankind but merely for the elect, on the ground that God's decrees *ex hypothesi* cannot fail of their effect, and that if, as is the case, certain men are not saved by the Cross, this can only be because God had not intended that they should be saved by the Cross. The only point left unsettled by this rigidly logical scheme was the question whether God predestined His elect in eternity without any regard to the future history of mankind, and then decreed the Fall in order that there might be a *massa damnata* out of which to pick them: or whether He first foresaw the Fall and the consequent corruption of mankind, and then resolved to elect certain favoured individuals out of the "mass of perdition". Those who, following Calvin and Beza, held the former opinion were known as "Supra-lapsarians," the adherents of the latter as "Sub-" or "Infra-lapsarians." The controversy between these two schools was raging in Holland in the year 1588, when a certain Jakob Harmensen, better known under the Latinized form of his name as Arminius, became a pastor of the Reformed Church at Amsterdam. Owing to his intellectual gifts, and to what had hitherto been the unimpeachable orthodoxy of his Calvinism, he was invited to draw up a treatise against an "Infra-lapsarian" manifesto published by the pastors of Delft. His study of the subject, however, had the effect of filling him with disgust at the unattractive picture of God which strict Calvinism presented and he began to teach a doctrine of salvation which the ultra-orthodox of his Church and country were not slow to accuse of Pelagianism. In 1603, he became a professor at the University of Leyden, in which capacity he proceeded to develop what, on the whole, appears to be the most scientific system of Synergism that has ever appeared. He was, naturally accused of disloyalty to the position of the Reformed Church, especially by one Gomar, a fanatical supra-lapsarian, on whom he retorted the accusation of Manicheism. The struggle between these two divines and their respective followers divided Holland into two camps; Arminius himself

escaped from the conflict by death in 1609, but his followers continued to maintain his position, which they embodied in a "Remonstrance" presented to the States of Holland and containing five Articles. Considerations of space forbid us to quote these at length;¹ but the gist of them may be formulated as follows:

I. The first Article affirms that God by an immutable, pre-mundane decree determined to save out of the sinful mass of mankind those who, through the grace of the Holy Spirit, were going to believe in His Son and were going to persevere in this faith, through the same grace, to the end (*eos . . . qui credituri inque ea ipsa fide . . . usque ad finem essent perseveraturi*): and also to leave the incorrigible and unbelieving in sin and to condemn them as aliens from Christ.

Superficially, this looks thoroughly Augustinian and Calvinistic; but the sting of the sentence resides in the use of the future participles *credituri*, *perseveraturi*, and the omission to qualify the word "grace" by the adjective "alone"; which obviously leaves the door open for, and consequently insinuates, the view that man can utilise or not utilise the grace offered him, and that God has only predestined to eternal life those whom He foresaw as going to utilise it rightly through the exercise of their own free will. The Article thus covertly denies the strict Calvinistic doctrines of an absolute double predestination and of irresistible grace, and insinuates Synergism and predestination—not on the ground of foreseen merits, for the conception of human merit has no place in Protestant theology, but rather on the ground of foreseen faith and obedience.

II. It is asserted that Jesus Christ, the Saviour of the world, died for all and singular human beings (*pro omnibus et singulis hominibus*): yet so that no one actually becomes partaker of the remission of sins merited by Him except believers.

¹ The full text of the Remonstrance may be found in Schaff, *Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant Churches*, pp. 545-9.

This affirms the potential universality of redemption, in opposition to the Calvinistic dogma of "particular redemption", which declared that Christ died only for the elect.

III. Affirms the moral and spiritual impotence of fallen man, prior to the reception of the Holy Spirit, in terms which a strict Calvinist would not have challenged.

IV. Affirms as a consequence the universal necessity of grace, but denies its irresistibility (*cæterum, quod ad modum operationis eius gratiae attinet, non est ille irresistibilis, quandoquidem scriptum est de multis, quod "Spiritu Sancto restiterint"*).

V. The fifth and last Article affirms what may be called "post-conversional Synergism", that is, the theory that although prevenient grace is absolutely necessary in order to initiate the beginnings of the Christian life, nevertheless, when that life has once been initiated the powers of free will to a certain extent revive and man's co-operation with grace becomes a reality; though the Remonstrants carefully safeguard themselves against the Pelagianism which would leave grace out of sight altogether and attribute to free will the power of securing salvation in its own strength. The last sentence of the Article raises the question whether the renewed capacities of free will include the power of going back behind the beginnings of faith imparted by prevenient grace, and apostatizing altogether; this possibility was denied by the strict Calvinistic doctrine of the indefectibility of the elect, which is a logical consequence of the Augustinian idea of the "gift of final perseverance", as freely but infallibly bestowed by God. The Remonstrants declined to affirm strict indefectibility, but declared themselves open to conviction by arguments based upon a more accurate reading of Holy Scripture.

It will be seen from the foregoing analysis that the *differentia* of Armenian Synergism, which distinguishes it clearly from the "semi-Pelagian" Synergism of Cassian, the Franciscan schoolmen, Melanchthon and Strigel, is its insistence on the necessity of strictly prevenient grace and its confinement of

the sphere of man's possible co-operation with grace to his life *after* conversion. It is clear that Arminius would have rejected, as explicitly as did his opponents, the maxim "*facienti quod in se est deus non denegat gratiam.*"

Arminianism won many adherents amongst the Reformed clergy of Holland and amongst laymen of note, of whom the best known was the celebrated Grotius, philosopher, theologian and statesman. Nevertheless, the mass of the people remained firmly attached to rigid Calvinism, and Arminianism became involved in various political movements, to its own undoing. In 1618 Maurice, Prince of Orange, convened a National Synod at Dordrecht (the "Synod of Dort") which condemned obstinate Arminians to deprivation of their offices and in some cases to banishment and reaffirmed unadulterated Calvinism. As the Canons of Dort have attained to a high rank as a confessional document of the Reformed Church, some typical declarations may be quoted from them:

Absolute double predestination. Can. vii. "Now election is the unchangeable purpose of God, whereby, before laying the foundations of the world He elected in accordance with the most free good pleasure of His will, out of mere favour (*ex mera gratia*), from the whole race of mankind, which had fallen from its primitive integrity into sin and destruction by its own fault, a fixed number of individual men, who were neither better nor worthier than others but lay with them in the same wretchedness. These men He elected for salvation in Christ . . . ; and consequently He decreed to grant them unto Christ to be saved by Him, to call and draw them efficaciously to His fellowship by His word and Spirit—that is, to give them true faith towards Himself, to justify and sanctify them, and, having powerfully preserved them in the fellowship of His Son finally to glorify them . . ."

Can x. "The cause of this gratuitous election is the sole good pleasure of God, not consisting in this, that He chose certain qualities or actions of men, out of all possible qualities

or actions, as a condition of salvation; but rather in this, that He acquired to Himself certain particular individuals out of the common multitude of sinners as a peculiar possession . . .”

Can. xv. “This eternal and gratuitous grace of our election is most vividly illustrated, and is commended to us by Holy Scripture, by the fact that, according to the testimony of Scripture, not all men are elected, but certain men are not elected, or are passed over (*præteritos*) in God’s eternal election. These men assuredly God, in accordance with His most free, most just, irreprehensible, and immutable good pleasure, has decreed to leave in the common misery, into which they had precipitated themselves by their own fault; He has decreed not to present them with saving faith and the grace of conversion, but to leave them in their own ways and subject to His just judgment; and finally He has decreed, not merely on account of their lack of faith, but also of all their other sins, to condemn them, for a declaration of His justice, and to punish them eternally. And this is the decree of Reprobation, which by no means makes God the author of sin (which it would be blasphemy to think) but makes Him a tremendous, irreprehensible, and just Judge and avenger.”

The elect possess the assured consciousness of election. Can. xii. “Of this eternal and immutable election of themselves to salvation, the elect are informed (*certiores redduntur*) each at his own time, though in varying degrees and with unequal measure (of certitude); not indeed by curious prying into the deep mysteries of God, but by observing in themselves, with spiritual joy and holy pleasure (*cum spirituali gaudio et sancta uoluptate*) the infallible fruits of election, designated as such in the word of God, namely, true faith towards Christ, a filial fear of God, godly sorrow for sin, hunger and thirst after righteousness, etc.”

God’s freedom of election based upon His absolute sovereignty. Cap. I, xviii. “To him who murmurs against this grace of gratuitous election, and the severity of just reprobation, we

poppose that apostolic utterance, 'O man, who art thou that repliest against God?' (Rom. ix, 20)—and that word of our Saviour, 'Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?' (Matt. xx, 15)."

The atoning death of Christ only meant to benefit the elect. Cap. II, viii. "This was the most free counsel and most gracious will and intention of God the Father, that the quickening and saving efficacy of the most precious death of His Son should extend to all the elect, for bestowing *upon them alone* the gift of justifying faith thereby to bring them infallibly to salvation: that is, it was the will of God, that Christ by the blood of the Cross, whereby He confirmed the new covenant, should effectually redeem out of every people, tribe, nation and language, all those, *and those only*, who were from eternity chosen to salvation, and given to Him by the Father . . ."

The indefectibility of the saints. Cap. V, vi. "God, who is rich in mercy, according to His immutable purpose of election, does not wholly withdraw the Holy Spirit from His own chosen ones, even in their melancholy falls; nor does He suffer them to slide so far that they fall from the grace of adoption and the state of justification; nor does He allow them to commit that sin which is 'unto death,' or 'against the Holy Ghost'; nor does He permit them to be totally deserted by Himself and so to hurl themselves into eternal destruction."¹

The "twice-born" temperament thus triumphed at the Synod of Dort, as it probably always will triumph in conciliar assemblies owing to the intensity of its vehemence and driving power; but the "once-born" man, who must always constitute the major portion of the Christian Church, is not so easily put down. Repressive measures crushed Arminianism in Holland; but, persecuted in its birthplace, it leaped the North Sea and found a congenial home in England. Those of the Thirty-Nine Articles which deal with grace, free will and predestination, though Calvinistic in sound were nevertheless susceptible of an

¹ Schaff, op. cit., pp. 551-79.

Arminian construction. The Catholic revival under Laud became associated with an Arminian theology of grace and both with the cause of the King as against Parliament, Presbyterianism, and absolute predestinarianism. Eclipsed in the simultaneous overthrow of altar and throne by the Civil War, Arminianism returned in company with the Restored Monarchy, and for a century its influence was dominant in the English Church, though with the rise of the Latitudinarian school of divines, who deprecated the subtle questionings involved in the doctrine of grace, "Arminianism" came to mean little more than opposition to Calvinism. Amongst Arminian theologians of eminence may be mentioned Cudworth, Jeremy Taylor, Tillotson, Chillingworth, Stillingfleet, Burnet, and Pearson. Towards the end of the eighteenth century Arminianism sprang into new life as a genuinely religious force in the Evangelical revival, and especially in the Methodist movement. John Wesley himself was a convinced Arminian; and though Whitfield formed a body of Methodists adhering to the principles of strict Calvinism, Wesley's influence was powerful enough to make Arminianism the doctrinal basis of the evangelistic activities carried out by what is now the most numerous of English-speaking Christian bodies, Oecumenical Methodism.

VI

POST-TRIDENTINE CATHOLIC SYNERGISM

THOUGH the great religious upheaval of the sixteenth century had the effect of driving the nations of Europe apart into two mutually hostile camps, it is nevertheless, true to say that morally, and even to a certain extent theologically, the "Counter-Reformation" was really the South-European branch of the Reformation. The Council of Trent itself, which, by its uncompromising acceptance and perpetuation, albeit in a purified form, of the medieval system, did so much to accentuate and stereotype the division between Catholic and Protestant, could not escape from the revived interest in the doctrine of grace and the renewed influence of Augustinianism which was sweeping like a tidal wave over the thought of Christian Europe. Hence, next to those decrees and canons which treat of the doctrine of the Eucharist, the most important place in its *Acta* is occupied by the *decretum de iustificatione* (Sessio VI), in which, what may be described as a moderately Augustinian view of the process of salvation is set forth. Following the thought, and borrowing the phraseology, of the Second Council of Orange,¹ it affirms that fallen man cannot raise himself out of the mire of his sins through the strength of nature alone, nor yet through instruction in the moral law alone, though this is coupled with the assertion that free will is by no means extinguished by original sin, but only attenuated and warped in respect of its powers.² The beginnings of

¹ *V. supra*, pp. 63-66.

² *Decr. de iust.*, Cap. i.

justification take their rise solely and exclusively from the reception of prevenient grace, which is given without any previous merits of the recipient; the scholastic maxim, "facienti quod in se est deus non denegat gratiam" appears thus to be frankly thrown over, though Latin divines of a later date strive to explain it in a Tridentine sense. It is, however, in our power freely to accept and co-operate with, or freely to reject this grace; and the Council condemns those who hold that man is merely passive, like an inanimate object in his conversion.¹

(Note, that this position represents a weakening of the strict Augustinian view, and opens a door to Synergism; for, on a rigidly absolutist theory of grace, according to which unregenerate man can do literally *nothing* that is good in his own strength, we can only assent to one divine inspiration because we have been previously moved by a preceding divine inspiration to assent to it; and, however far we trace back the chain of the causality of good actions, with its alternating links of God's inspiration and man's assent, we must always, according to St. Augustine, come back to one first link, or one peg from which the whole chain depends—namely, absolutely prevenient grace, which is a pure act of God and not of man. The Council, however, did not endeavour to reconcile its teaching with that of the Doctor of Hippo, and contents itself with asserting the untruth, both of the opinion which holds that man can do nothing to save himself and of that which maintains that he can act effectively in order to his own salvation without the assistance of grace.)

Both in the *decretum* and in the canons on justification, "grace" is closely connected with the Holy Spirit, but no attempt is made to define the relation between these two terms; and, in general, the text of the Council's utterances is characterised by a noticeable, and doubtless prudent, abstention from the employment of technical scholastic terms. The

¹ Ibid., Cap. v; *canones de iust.* iv.

sixth chapter of the *decretum* contains a curious coincidence with the thought of the Formula of Concord commented on above, in that it assigns a prominent place to fear of the divine judgements in the process of the sinner's conversion¹; a noteworthy emergence of the "Evangelical" genius within the sphere of Latin Catholicism. The Council anathematizes "anyone who says that the grace whereby we are justified is merely the favour of God",² thereby (if its words are to be taken *au pied de la lettre*) anathematizing the usage of the New Testament; those, however, who remember the changes introduced by St. Augustine into the significance of the Pauline terms "grace" and "justification"³ will not need to be reminded that on this point the difference between the Reformers and the Fathers of Trent was purely terminological, though it is a difference which has been the parent of a vast amount of misunderstanding and confusion. The Council likewise, and with more reason, anathematizes the idea of predestination to evil,⁴ the doctrine of the indefectibility of the saints,⁵ and the belief that the elect can possess absolute certitude of their own election in this life.⁶

The Council of Trent is thus content to affirm the reality of free will and the universal necessity of grace side by side, making no effort to solve the age-long problem of the influence of grace upon free will. It was not, however, to be expected that the problem would remain long untouched; and, twenty-five years after the close of the Council, an attempt to solve it was published, bearing the ambitious title of *The Concord of free will with the gifts of grace, with divine prescience, providence,*

¹ *Decr. de iust.* Cap. vi: "dum peccatores se esse intelligentes, a diuinæ iustitiæ timore, quo utiliter concutiuntur, ad considerandam Dei misericordiam se conuertendo in spem eriguntur . . . etc."

² Can. xi.

³ *V. supra*, pp. 28, 29.

⁴ Can. xvii.

⁵ Can. xxiii.

⁶ *Decr. de iust.* cap. xii.

*predestination and reprobation.*¹ The author of this work was a Father of the Society of Jesus, Luis de Molina, from whose name the system of grace therein expounded has derived the title of "Molinism." Molina, with some *naïveté*, claimed for his theory, both that it was entirely original, and also that if St. Augustine and other primitive Fathers had known of it, they would undoubtedly have accepted it; also that, if it had only been discovered before, the heresies of Pelagianism, semi-Pelagianism, and Lutheranism with regard to grace and free will, would never have arisen. Of this theory it will be sufficient for the moment to say that it represents an attempt to develop the Synergistic aspects, noted above, of the teaching of Trent. It was vigorously controverted by a Dominican, Dominic Bañes, who reaffirmed the more predestinarian teaching of St. Thomas; from this clash of opinions grew the famous dispute *de auxiliis*, which, by a curious historical coincidence distracted the Church of Spain just about the same time that the Reformed Church of Holland was being racked by the parallel discussion provoked by the writings of Arminius. The debate waxed so hot that Pope Clement VIII appointed a special Congregation *de auxiliis* in order to bring it to an end. The Congregation sat until 1607, and then ended inconclusively; the consultors of the Congregation were in favour of condemning Molinism, but Paul V and the cardinals who were the constituent members of the Congregation postponed a formal condemnation *sine die*, on the advice of St. Francis of Sales. Paul V subsequently declared that both Thomism (the opinion advocated by Bañes) and Molinism were equally legitimate interpretations of the Catholic doctrine of grace. Nevertheless, the strength and determination of the Dominican opposition to Molinism made such a deep impression upon the authorities of the Society of Jesus, that in 1613 Acquaviva, General of the

¹ *Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiæ donis, diuina præscientia, providentia, prædestinatione et reprobatione.* (Lisbon, 1588: Paris reprint, 1876.)

Society issued an instruction imposing upon all Jesuit teachers and lecturers the duty of defending a modified form of Molinism which had been worked out by the celebrated Jesuit divine, Suarez, and which is generally known as Congruism. As the Synergist tendency amongst Latin theologians is now represented solely by Molinism and Congruism, our attention will be confined to these systems, and Thomism will only be mentioned incidentally.

It must be remembered in the first instance that Molina believed himself to be a loyal and enthusiastic follower both of St. Augustine and of St. Thomas Aquinas, whom he styles "the sun and prince of Scholastic philosophy".¹ Consequently, the problem before him is, not how to minimise predestination in such a way as to leave full scope for free will, nor yet how to whittle down free will in order to vindicate the absoluteness of predestination, but, on the assumption that human freedom of choice and absolute divine predestination are equally realities, to explain the mode and *rationale* of their co-existence. Now, as God's predestination of the elect is simply one instance of that general control of human history, as of the rest of the world-process, which we call His "providence", it is clear that such an account must begin with an investigation of the general principles which determine the relation of God's foreknowledge to the contingent results of human choice. This investigation begins by assuming the scholastic distinction of God's knowledge into "the knowledge of (i.e. knowledge consisting in) vision" (*scientia uisionis*)—which is the act of timeless contemplation whereby God knows that which has existed in the past, which exists in the present, and which will exist in the future—and "the knowledge of simple understanding" (*scientia simplicis intelligentiæ*), whereby He contemplates the real of objects which have not existed, do not now exist and never will exist. These two kinds of knowledge are called by Molina "free" and "natural". The latter adjective seems to

¹ *Concordia*, "ad lectorem."

mean that God, in contemplating a totally non-existent object, such as a unicorn or a harpy (if we may assume, for the sake of argument, that such creatures never will exist in any future universe), does not know it as a fact, but merely knows the nature which it would have if it did exist. The first kind of knowledge, on the other hand, is, according to St. Thomas, indissolubly associated with God's agency as Creator and Prime Mover; it is not the case that He foreknows things because they will exist, but rather that they will exist because He foreknows them. Hence, for Thomism, prevision and predetermination are the same thing; God decrees the result of our "free" choice by foreknowing it. Consequently, the Thomists do not hesitate to speak of grace as a *præmotio physica* impinging upon the human will. At this point, however, Molina deserts his master; for this "physical premotion" seemed to him to destroy free will. Nevertheless, he does not want to surrender the divine control of the world-process; he wants to be able to say, for instance, "God decreed from all eternity that St. Paul should go over to Macedonia, and yet St. Paul went over to Macedonia of his own free will." The central and original conception of Molina's scheme, on which he relies for the accomplishment of this feat, is that of the divine *scientia media*, which may perhaps be Englished as "mediating knowledge".

This knowledge is described as "mediating" because, according to Molina, it occupies a half-way position between the "free" knowledge whereby God knows realities, past, present or future, and the "natural" knowledge with which He envisages absolute non-realities. This is because the objects of the *scientia media* occupy an ambiguous plane, which comes half-way between the real and the unreal; they are *futurabilia*, things of which it can only be said that they would exist if certain previous conditions were realised. "Mediating knowledge," therefore, thus has for its object the sphere of the hypothetically real, as contrasted with the spheres of the

absolutely real and the absolutely unreal. Inasmuch, therefore, as God knows with infallible certainty, in virtue of the *scientia media*, how an individual free will, will actually decide in any given set of circumstances, He decrees in eternity to create, out of all possible universes, precisely that universe in which a given individual will decide in the way in which God wishes him to decide. To take the instance mentioned above, God knew through the *scientia media* that if St. Paul at a certain stage of his career found himself at Troas, and there received a call to go over into Macedonia, he would freely obey the call; and He therefore resolved to create a universe constituted in such a way that at the right moment St. Paul would actually find himself in Troas. This general principle of the *scientia media* explains not merely God's general providential governance of human history, but also that specialised part of it which we call the economy of grace. God knows infallibly how each soul, in the exercise of perfect freedom, will respond to the grace which He bestows; consequently, He is able to secure the ultimate arrival in heaven of all those whose names appear in the eternally-closed list of the elect, by supplying them with graces to which He knows, through the *scientia media*, that they will freely respond. In the same way He secures the ultimate damnation of the reprobate, without prejudicing their free will, by bestowing on them graces to which He knows that they will *not* respond. The kinship, indeed identity, of this scheme with the thoughts which, as we have already seen, M. Portalié has discovered in solution in St. Augustine's writings, will be obvious.¹

It will be seen at once, that in effect Molinism abolishes the distinction between "sufficient" and "efficacious" grace. *Ex parte Dei*, grace is the same for all; but if a given grace is accepted by the will, it becomes "efficacious", if not, it remains "merely sufficient". Molina, however, cannot in so many words abandon the position (which had behind it not merely

¹ *V. supra*, p. 37 ff.

the authority of St. Augustine but also that of the inspired proof-text, "It is God which worketh in you both to will *and to do* of His good pleasure")¹ that it is God who actually does our good deeds; and he reconciles this with free will by the hypothesis of *concursum simultaneum*, which is the second distinguishing point of the Molinistic system, and stands in sharp opposition to the Thomistic *præmotio physica*. As before, this principle is first of all worked out in relation to God's providential government of the natural order, and then applied to the supernatural order of grace. In the case of all human actions—even of sins—God co-operates with man to a certain extent, in virtue of the *assistentia generalis* involved in His immanence; though, in respect of wrong actions, His co-operation is limited to supporting the physical entity of the act, and has nothing to do with its formal malice, which resides solely in the will of the human agent. So, when a man commits a cold-blooded murder, God co-operates in his action, in so far as He continues to maintain the general laws of chemistry, physics, and ballistics which determine the course of the bullet, and the laws of physiology which entail death upon the piercing of a vital organ; yet the homicidal intention which initiated the bullet's flight is all the murderer's own. The impact of grace upon human personality involves a similar *concursum*. A supernaturally meritorious action is the effect of a pre-established harmony of two causes, the divine will and the human, though the divine will does not so much move the human will (the Thomistic position) as exert a collaterally exciting or stimulating effect upon it. It is clear that we have here a genuinely Synergistic theory; and this conclusion is confirmed by the illustration which is sometimes used to explain the Molinist conception of grace, that of two men simultaneously tugging at the rope which hauls a barge along. Synergism, as we have already suggested, is not really consistent with the conception of strictly prevenient grace; and,

¹ Phil. ii, 13.

though this conception is too deeply rooted in the authority of St. Augustine for Molina to be able to drop it, it would seem that what he means by the term is not so much strictly "prevenient" grace, i.e. grace which precedes and causes the first Godward motions of the will, but rather the first co-operant grace, i.e. that one of the series of co-operant graces which is first in order of time, and assists, though it does not necessarily cause, the beginnings of those Godward motions.

It is natural to inquire whether Molinism is prepared to accept that view of predestination which we have seen to be the inevitable corollary of Synergism—namely, the doctrine of predestination *post prævisa merita*. Molinist theologians have, as a matter of fact, been almost equally divided between *ante merita* and *post merita* predestinarianism; but the answer given by Molina himself seems to be that which coheres most logically with his system, and is, moreover, of sufficient subtlety and ingenuity to deserve special notice. This is, that the elect are predestined to glory *ante prævisa absoluta merita, sed post prævisa conditionata merita*. (Reprobation, however, it would seem, is purely *ex prævisis demeritis*.) The meaning of this may be most briefly explained by an illustration. God need not have created St. Paul at all, nor, having decided to create him, need He have decided to include his name in the list of the elect; from this point of view, therefore, St. Paul's predestination was purely *ante merita*. On the other hand, his name occurs in the list of the elect because God foresaw that, under circumstances in which He intended to place him, he would in fact respond to grace; and from this point of view, he was predestined *post merita*.

It is, perhaps, unnecessary to point out that the Achilles' heel of Molinism lies in its doctrine of the *scientia media*. It may always be urged against this that if God infallibly knows the future results of the will's free choice, this can only be because there is something in the will which ensures that it will decide in a particular way; and if this be admitted, we are

at once landed in determinism. Doubtless it is the case that, if God is omniscient, He must *somehow* be able to foresee the strictly contingent; but the "somehow" is not explained by the invention of a mysterious faculty labelled *scientia media*, nor does the invention of this label dispose of the *prima facie* difficulty that an absolutely free decision which has not yet been taken is, strictly speaking, a non-entity, and can, therefore, be known, not as a fact, but only as a possibility.

From the point of view of the seventeenth century, however, the main objection to pure Molinism was the fact that it denied that any grace was efficacious *ab intrinseco*, and made the *differentia* of "efficacious grace" to consist in its acceptance by the will. It was felt that to make the act of God depend for its success upon the consent of a mortal creature detracted from the majesty and mystery of the divine operation. Hence in the hands of Suarez, Vasquez, and Bellarmine the system of Molina developed into Congruism, which makes the efficaciousness of grace depend upon its "congruity" to the circumstances of the recipient at the time of its bestowal. "When the circumstances are comparatively adverse (*incongrua*) grace remains merely sufficient. A prudent father who knows how to govern his children without physical force will speak the right word to each at the proper time. Similarly God adapts His grace, if it is to prove efficacious, to the circumstances of each individual case, thereby attaining His purpose without fail. Thus the reckless youth on the city streets needs more powerful graces than the pious nun in her secluded convent cell, because he is exposed to stronger temptations and his environment is unfavourable to religious influences. Since grace is conferred with a wise regard to temperament, character, inclinations, prejudices, time and place, there exists between it and free-will a sort of intrinsic affinity, which in the hands of God becomes an infallible means of executing His decrees."¹

This reconstruction of Molinism frankly throws over the

¹ Pohle-Preuss, *Grace Actual and Habitual*, p. 262 f.

Synergistic element in it, and reverts to pure Augustinianism. As the reader will remember, we have met the doctrine of "congruous" and "incongruous" graces in St. Augustine; and, though Congruism may represent an exceedingly deft and ingenious method of dove-tailing predestination and free will together, it does not seem to escape from the destructive moral criticism which may be brought against the Augustinian theory. Doubtless a father can control his children, without coercion, by speaking the right word at the right moment; but what would be thought of a father who, in order that his child might go on misbehaving itself, and that he might accordingly have the satisfaction of punishing it, deliberately refrained from speaking the appropriate word, or spoke the inappropriate one? For sheer mental power and philosophic acuteness the great post-Tridentine theologians of the Roman Church may challenge those of any other age or denomination; and the fact that, nevertheless, Thomist, Molinist and Congruist alike are compelled in the last resort to invoke the mystery which shrouds all the operations of the Divine Being as a means of covering up the *lacunæ* in their systems is a singularly vivid illustration of the logical bankruptcy of Augustinianism.

VII

GRACE IN MODERN THOUGHT

THE reader who has followed the foregoing sketch of the development of the ecclesiastical concept of grace, which we have seen to describe an almost circular course, beginning with the "congruous vocation" of Augustine's treatise *ad Simplicianum*¹ and ending in the "Congruism" of Suarez and Vasquez, may find the melancholy lines of the Persian poet rising to his lips:

"Myself when young did eagerly frequent
Doctor and Saint, and heard great argument
About it and about: but evermore
Came out by the same Door as in I went."

If, however, he has not lost patience with the puny efforts of man's intellect to comprehend the workings of God within the soul, the question may well occur to him, "Is it not possible that the method employed by all these thinkers, Fathers, Schoolmen, Reformers, and post-Tridentine Latin divines, is really outworn? Does not this review of past history, with its consistent record of failures to provide a satisfactory definition of grace, or a reasonable solution of the problem of grace and free will, suggest that the whole *modus operandi* which consists in endeavouring to deduce mathematically certain propositions from the literal sense of isolated Scriptural proof-texts, from the normative authority of St. Augustine, and from supposed metaphysical truths as to the nature of God or the

¹ i, 13: v. *supra*, p. 42.

workings of the divine mind, should now be laid aside? and may not the problem become more tractable if it be regarded as belonging to the sphere of psychology rather than to that of metaphysics, and if, piercing through the shell of theory, we devote ourselves to the direct study of the experiences, of which the main types of theory are so many 'rationalisations'?" Such a method of approach to dogmatic subjects is, indeed, characteristic of the theology of the nineteenth century, which has been deeply affected by the overwhelming predominance of the empirical and inductive elements in the secular sciences. This essay may appropriately be closed by a brief review of one or two attempts which have been made to study the phenomena of grace inductively, and by a sketch of the conclusions which, to the present author at least, appear to be provisionally established.

Within the sphere of Protestant thought, to which we now return, the real breach with the Augustinian and scholastic tradition was made, not by the great leaders of the Classical period of the Reformation, but by Friedrich Schleiermacher, whose epoch-making genius is still recognised.¹ He was the first explicitly to conceive the idea of abandoning *in toto* the deductive method in theology, which assumed that theological truth could be ascertained by ratiocination from fixed principles, scriptural or traditional, or both; and to substitute an inductive, or rather descriptive, method, which starts afresh from the living realities of religion as experienced by the devout soul. The romantic and mystical bent of his mind, intensified by reaction from the barren rationalism of the *Aufklärung*, led him to find the essence of religion in intuition, and in the feeling which he describes as "pious self-consciousness" or "God-consciousness". So far, this is satisfactory enough to the modern religious mind, which does not base its belief in God on any

¹ There are still many insights in Schleiermacher of great importance for the contemporary philosophical assessment of religion. Dr. James Richmond, *Faith and Philosophy*, 1966

scholastic or metaphysical arguments for His existence, but upon its immediate awareness of His presence: and which is not in the least abashed by learning that its developed consciousness of God's fatherly love and protection is a flower springing from a primitive root which is the savage's feeling of awe and fascination in the presence of the "numinous". Unfortunately, however, as most Christians will think, the God of Schleiermacher is pantheistically conceived as the Absolute or the Infinite, whose description in terms of personality is no more than a piece of necessary mythology. In the ocean of His all-pervasive immanence the malignity of evil-doing is dissolved away, and "sin" in man becomes simply identical with the "sense of sin"; which is defined as being a feeling of discomfort or disgust occasioned by the hampering or constricting of our God-consciousness, and is treated as an inevitable anomaly incidental to upward evolution and moral progress. Redemption, therefore, consists in the liberation of the hampered God-consciousness which man already possesses; and this is achieved by Christ and by Him alone, because He possessed the consciousness of God in perfect and transcendent measure. Though we should not be justified in postulating an ontological difference between His nature and ours, nevertheless His awareness of God was so keen and intense that it is permissible for us to speak of an unique "presence" or "indwelling" of God in Him. This liberating activity exercised by Christ on the souls of men is "grace"—the *kindness* of God (we note the characteristic Protestant revival of the Pauline meaning of χάρις) revealed in the saving work of His Son.

How, or through what means, does Schleiermacher conceive this liberating activity as being exercised? It is difficult to crystallise with certainty the meaning of so diffuse and elusive a writer into a few words; but it seems probable that the saving activities of the Founder of Christianity are really conceived on much the same lines as those which might conceivably

lead us to speak of a posthumous political and juridical activity of Napoleon; that is to say, as consisting in the psychic contagion of His example, the magnetic attractiveness of His life as recorded in the Gospels, and the inherent sublimity and charm of His teaching. In a word, grace consists in indirect suggestions, arising ultimately from the historic personality of Christ, but mediated through the records of His life and teaching and through the spiritual traditions and atmosphere of the community which He founded. We thus get a new conception of grace as personal *suggestion*, which appears at first sight to stand in diametrical opposition to the old ecclesiastical and scholastic conception of grace as supernatural power; and though Ritschl and his disciples repudiated the pantheism of Schleiermacher, the "suggestive" conception of grace still holds its ground as the central concept of liberal Protestant soteriology.

The student of the history of doctrine may here be inclined to quote the words "That which hath been is that which shall be, and there is no new thing under the sun." For this instructional and "suggestive" conception of grace is nothing other than that which was opposed to the teaching of Augustine by Pelagianism in the fifth century of our era. We still seem confronted by the clash between two extreme conceptions—the mechanical conception of grace as an irresistible force, which is none the less mechanical whether it be conceived as operating in accordance with a pre-mundane decree of predestination, or as infused *ex opere operato* through sacramental rites; and, on the other hand, a rationalised conception of grace which explains it as consisting solely in, or expressing itself solely through, the teaching and example of Christ. The latter conception certainly avoids raising the two intractable problems of "nature and grace" and "grace and free will" inherent in the ecclesiastical conception; but it has little comfort for the sinner who cries, "The evil that I would not that I do," and who, when confronted with the example of Christ's victory

over temptation can only reply: "Doubtless He could—but I can't."

Yet, scattered about the various systems which we have passed in review, there are many aspects and facets of truth which must surely find a place in any modern theology of grace which is to do full justice to its mysterious theme. Augustinianism, which is the expression of the pure passion of religion, testifies to the "twice-born" soul's sense of the overwhelming majesty of God and of its own creaturely dependence upon Him—to our consciousness of an interior infirmity and disharmony of our nature, which is simply "given" in birth and for which we are not individually responsible—to the irresistible feelings which we all experience, of freedom *before*, and determination *after*, the making of an irrevocable decision—to the religious man's awareness of "grace" as liberating, and not as over-riding, "nature". The classical Protestant developments of Augustinianism did a permanent service to religion by banishing the sordid conception of "merit" from our conception of the relations between God and man. None the less, the "once-born" thinker speaks with self-evident truth when he points out that the essential quality of a moral action excludes the attribution of mere passivity to its agent—that the hypothesis of "original guilt", or the juridical culpability for our first father's sin, is an incredible self-contradiction—that the operation of grace should be conceived rather as the influence of friend upon friend than as the working of the sculptor upon inanimate rock. Is it possible to find an intellectual presentation of the nature and workings of "grace" which will combine these diverse points into a single harmony, and strike the right balance between the deliverances of the two great types of religious experience? What follows does not pretend to do more than sketch the lines on which such a synthesis might be built up, disclaiming any attempt to formulate it with scholastic precision.

The reality of "grace" (as before understood in the

ecclesiastical and conventional, rather than in the strictly Biblical, sense of the word) is bound up with the essential truth of the idea known as that of "original sin". If it is the case that all men suffer, not merely from intellectual ignorance or error, but from an inbred emotional and volitional dislocation which they have not acquired individually for themselves, and which they cannot individually remove by their own efforts—and if there is a merciful Father in heaven, Who "willeth that all men should be saved"—then there *must* be a healing power of God, penetrating and transforming regions of man's personality which lie far deeper than the area of conscious thought; the Gospel *must* be δύναμις θεοῦ, a power of God sweeping on to salvation everyone that believeth. I have elsewhere argued in favour of the reality of the disease, and must therefore take both it and the reality of the remedy, which is grace, for granted. But I would suggest that our comprehension of grace will be enormously deepened and enriched if we take a step, on the verge of which, as we have seen, Christian theology has perpetually hovered, but which has actually been taken only by a few divines—namely, the frank equation of "grace" with the Person of the Holy Spirit. There are not two healing powers going forth from God, one personal and the other impersonal; nor is grace a quasi-material something deposited in the soul by the Holy Spirit; there is only one glorious sanctifying Divine Power, which our Lord and His Apostles call the Spirit, but which we may, if we chose, name under the title of "grace" (very much as the Jewish apocalyptists, from motives of reverence and to avoid a too frequent employment of the name of God, described the supreme Object of worship as "the Great Glory"). If it be frankly recognised that "the Spirit" and "grace" are synonyms, we shall be able to recover the Pauline point of view concerning πνεῦμα without jettisoning the familiar terminology of "grace" now consecrated by the usage of well-nigh seventeen centuries. We shall, indeed, have to abandon the language of Newman's well-known verse:

“And that a higher gift than grace
Should flesh and blood refine,
God’s presence and his very Self,
And Essence all-divine”—

for, on our hypothesis, there *is* no “higher gift than grace”; grace *is* “God’s presence and his very Self, and Essence all-divine.” Such an identification of “grace” with the Third Person of the Holy Trinity ought to be the surest safeguard against mechanically impersonal conceptions of grace, as against the tendency to relapse into the savage notion of good *mana*¹; it would give a vivid and easily intelligible content to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, which for too many professing Christians remains thin and impoverished, precisely because so many of His beneficent operations have, under the influence of Augustinian terminology, been mentally detached from His Divine Person and ascribed to an impersonal entity known as grace.

Such a simplification of the doctrines of “grace” and “the Spirit,” by the equation of these two terms, has the further effect of abolishing the root issue as between Augustinianism and Semi-Pelagianism—the question, namely, whether (in scholastic terminology) strictly “prevenient” grace is in all cases necessary to initiate the beginnings of the redeemed life, or whether fallen man can make certain feeble efforts in a Godward direction, in virtue of his natural human qualities (or *pura naturalia*) coupled with the *assistentia generalis* which God gives to all His creatures by His immanence in them and support of their being. For, on the principles of traditional theology, the *assistentia generalis* must be referred to the Logos or Thought of God, “in whom all things cohere”;² and the doctrine of the *Perichoresis*, or reciprocal co-inherence of the Three Divine Persons, which forbids us to think of Them

¹ *V. supra*, p. 8.

² Col. i, 17.

as three separate individuals, and affirms that the activity of all is involved in the activity of each, will then make it impossible to draw too sharp a distinction—or any fundamental distinction at all—between the *assistentia generalis* which is the work of the Second, and the *gratia* which is, or is the activity of, the Third hypostasis in the Godhead. The latter may well be an intensified mode of the former; and such a view would supplement the modern conception of a continuous ascent of created things through the successive levels of Matter, Life, Mind, and Spirit, by the august conception of a corresponding and simultaneous descent of God's power in the successive forms of *assistentia generalis*, appropriate to the stone, the brute, and the "natural" or "psychic" man,¹ and *gratia sanctificans*, the gift of the Spirit which is the privilege of the supernaturally adopted sons of God. We should be able to retain the Augustinian language of our ancient collect—"Lord, we pray thee that thy grace may always prevent and follow us"—whilst abstaining from inhumanly severe judgements upon unregenerate human nature, and upholding the mild and reasonable maxim of the Franciscan schoolmen "*facienti quod in se est deus non denegat gratiam.*"

If "grace" is the Holy Spirit, its operations must be those of a Person upon a person. The analogy of human personal intercourse supports St. Augustine's distinction of the avenues of God's grace into "the providentially prepared action of exterior causes" and "interior illumination".² For a good father often acts as an "earthly providence" to his children, not merely by giving them good suggestions himself, but by placing them in circumstances in which they will be shielded from wrong, and exposed to right influences. "Special providences", therefore, as well as the *assistentia generalis*, are utilised by, and subsumed in, the operations of grace. But the ultimate kernel of a "special providence" is a direct influence

¹ See 1 Cor. ii, 14.

² *V. supra*, pp. 32, 38, n. 3.

exerted by God upon the personality of a human being. When, for instance, in the remarkable novel *The Bridge of San Luis Rey* the author exhibits the collapse of a bridge, and the consequent removal from human life of a small body of people who happened to be on it at the moment of the collapse, as an instance of a marvellously calculated "special providence", by showing that each of the individuals in question had come to a point of his or her life at which transference to the other world was the only solution of some overwhelming problem, he does not, I imagine, mean to suggest that we are to conceive of the Almighty as interfering with the atomic structure of the bridge so as to make it collapse at the precise moment when certain individuals were on it; but rather that, by deftly-administered sub-conscious impulses, He shepherded those individuals on to the bridge at the precise moment when it would in any case have collapsed. Whatever may be thought of this fictitious instance, it at least illustrates the principle that "special providence" ultimately presupposes "interior divine impulse", and consequently that all forms of grace are ultimately reducible to this latter category. We have therefore to ask, Is it possible to find a way of conceiving "grace" as an interior divine impulse or influence which is genuinely that of a Person exerted upon a person—in other words, which assists, without impairing, free will, and which is real without being strictly irresistible?

We may here find guidance in the *dictum* of St. Augustine that grace is to be upheld "not in disparagement of nature, but as that which liberates . . . nature"¹; and in Schleiermacher's position, mentioned above, that sin, or at any rate sinfulness, is a hampering or constriction of man's God-consciousness. We may, then, conceive the congenital disease of human nature as an inhibition or repression which blocks the flow of man's emotional energies in a Godward direction, and diverts it in excessive volume into the channels of the two

¹ *Retract.* ii, 42.

other primary instincts. Now a lesson may be learnt from the methods employed by psychiatrists as surgeons of the mind in dealing with injurious repressions of lesser importance. The first step is to discover the existence of such repressions, to drag them up into consciousness and reveal them to the patient himself. Sometimes the effect of this is to dissolve away the inhibition so that no further treatment is needed. Often, however, this is not the case, and treatment by analysis has to be succeeded by treatment through suggestion. The physician gently and gradually reduces the emotional dislocation from which the patient is suffering by monotonous, soothing, and often repeated formulae, which implant in his subconscious mind ideas of health, peace, freedom, and joy, there to germinate and to leaven his whole being. But any successful practitioner in the art of healing through suggestion will tell you that his work is not confined to the mere vocal repetition of quasi-liturgical incantations, but that he has to put his whole will-power into it; that virtue in a real sense goes out of him, so that at the end of a full day's work he is left emotionally and physically tired; and that the successful practice of the art involves a setting up of a telepathic bond between healer and patient, energy and vitality being invisibly transfused from the consciousness of one into the subconsciousness of the other. The healer and the healed become for a limited time, and in a very imperfect degree, a spiritual unity, their personalities in some incomprehensible manner interpenetrating and blending.

This beneficent relation between two human beings gives us a category by means of which we may represent to ourselves the ineffable relation between the great Physician, the Holy Ghost, and the disordered soul in which He dwells, and which, with the slow persistence of infinite love, He is gradually conforming to the image of Christ's perfect humanity. In and through the union of the soul with Him, which is effected through Baptism, strengthened in Confirmation, and per-

petually renewed and refreshed through Holy Communion, the mutual interpenetration of healer and patient is seen raised to its highest power. It was suggested some years ago by a scholar of great distinction, the late Dr. Sanday, that the subconscious in man is that part of his personality which is most accessible to *direct* Divine influences as distinct from the *indirect* influences which are mediated through study, intercourse with fellow-men, reading of the Bible, and other activities of the conscious mind. This suggestion was received with less respect than was its due, partly because Dr. Sanday's main eminence lay in the sphere of critical and exegetical scholarship, and the world of theologians is subject to the same perversity as the wider world of mankind in general, which is prone to assume that because a man is eminent in one sphere it is therefore impossible for him to think of a good or useful idea in connection with another. Nevertheless, I venture to revive the view which he put forward, which seems to me to rest upon a true theory of the nature of personality, and of the operation of the Divine being; and I would maintain that if the analogy of psycho-therapy be worked out consistently, it gives us a theory of sacramental grace which entirely eludes the reproach contained in the epithets "mechanical" and "sub-personal", and reveals the term "grace" as standing for nothing other than the living God Himself, penetrating the subconscious selves of His disciples through the power of His Spirit, and by inaudible, yet most real, suggestions of peace and purity, strength and unity, gradually transforming them into the image of Himself.

Such divine suggestions, operating in the region of the unconscious, no more exclude the co-operation of the conscious reason and will than do the suggestions imparted by a human psycho-therapist. And the moral consciousness, represented by the "once-born" Christian, imperatively demands the recognition of the reality of such co-operation. We must, therefore, affirm that Synergism is morally and intellectually

inevitable. No doubt the "twice-born" saint will challenge this affirmation with his characteristic demand that all human holiness, all man's good works, all his merits shall be ascribed to God and God alone; and no doubt it is true that all our good works are God's in so far as all presuppose His *assistentia generalis*. But it is impossible permanently to evade the conclusion that if literally all our good works are to be ascribed to Him in a more thoroughgoing sense than this, we must either abandon free will; or, if we persevere in endeavouring to maintain the impossible paradox that all is due to God and all, nevertheless, due to man's free will, must find ourselves committed to a pantheistic absorption of man into God, or a Positivist contraction of God into man. If the infinite Creator has condescended so far to limit Himself as to allow us consciousnesses really distinct from, though dependent on, His own, there seems no reason why we should not admit that He has acted in an analogous manner with regard to our wills and the free play of our moral personalities.


If we have followed the milder doctrine of grace so far, it is natural to follow it to the end, into that exalted region of thought where the conception of grace and its workings culminates in the idea of predestination. We cannot, indeed, agree with the saying of a distinguished modern divine, that "the doctrine of predestination has no place in the theology of to-day"; for we cannot abandon as meaningless the words of our Lord about the elect, the great utterance of the Epistle to the Ephesians which tells how God "chose us in Christ before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blemish before Him in love, having fore-ordained us unto adoption as sons . . . according to the good pleasure of His will, to the praise of the glory of His grace".¹ For a real and satisfying meaning can be assigned to these majestic words if they be interpreted in the light of predestination *post præuisa merita*; and the thought of the individually assigned

¹ Eph. i, 4 f.

heavenly mansions waiting for the elect can be retained, without destroying the point of the exhortation, "Give then all diligence to make your calling and election sure."¹ An absolute predestination indeed there is, decreed by God in eternity, without respect to foreseen merit, "not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that hath mercy"²; but it is a predestination to office, not necessarily to salvation, to membership of the Church in this life, and not necessarily to citizenship of the new Jerusalem in the next. That we were born of Christian parents and in a Christian country, brought to Baptism, incorporated into the new Israel and made members of the royal priesthood whose function is to evangelise the world, we clearly owe to no merits or efforts of our own, past or foreseen in the future, but only to the inscrutable decree of God; and the Christian who realises the splendid privileges and the humbling responsibilities implicit in membership of the visible Church on earth will be content with such a measure of predetermination as this implies, and not repine at the contingency which, if free will is a reality, must hedge about and condition his passage to the Church triumphant in Heaven.

¹ 2 Peter i, 10.

² Rom. ix, 16.





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